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THE NEW QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION:
NEW YORK'S REVIVAL OF A DOCTRINE
WHOSE Tn/IE HAS PASSED
Michael B. Mushlin*

In 1977, the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer u.
Heitnerl "reshaped the landscape of personal juri~diction."~
The
news that the Court had rejected the centuries-old doctrine that
quasi in rem jurisdiction could be based on the mere presence of
property within a state "reverberated from the conference rooms
of corporate headquarters to the halls of a~ademe."~
Prior to
Shaffer, every jurisdiction in the United States had employed
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966 Vanderbiit Univereits J.D. 1970
Northwestern University.
I am grateful for the thoughtful editorial assistance, encouragement and suggestions
of Professors Jay C. Carlisle, Donald L. Doernberg, and Barbnra Snlken. I am &o grateful for the assistance of Dean Janet A. Johnson and the helpful advice of P r o f m r 036nr
Chase and Professor David D. SiegeL I also wish to express my npprecintion for the
research assistance of Todd Masterman, Rachel hlolinaro, Richard Rosemeig, and
John Rudnick.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Note, Has ShafTer v. Heitner Been Lost a t Sea?, 46 LA. L REV. 141 (198.5).
Silberman, ShafTer v. Heitner: The End of a n EM,53 N.Y.U. L REV. 33 (1978).
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quasi in rern jurisdiction without serious que~tion.~
Quasi in rern jurisdiction is a device by which a party uses a
defendant's property to obtain judicial power to adjudicate a
claim.Wnlike in personam jurisdiction: quasi in rern jurisdiction depends upon pre-judgment attachment of the property,?
and has only limited res judicata effecL8 However, before Shaf-

R. MILLAR,
CIVILPROCEDURE
OF THE TRIALCOURT
IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
489
(1952). Prior to Shaffer, according to Professor Millar, attachment jurisdiction had
"blossomed and flourished, to become an almost indispensable constituent of our procodural systems." Id. at 481. See also C. DRAKE,A TREATISE ON THE LAWOP SUITSDY ATTACHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES37 (7th ed. 1891) (citing Pyrolusite M. Co. V. Ward, 73
Ga. 491,492 (1884), for the proposition that "[nlo one ever dreamed that the attachmont
laws of the several States authorizing attachments against non-resident defendants, woro
violative of the Constitution of the United States. Argument is unnecessary.").
Silberman, supra note 3, a t 39.
There are two types of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The first, specific property disputo
jurisdiction, determines the ownership of the property in a dispute between two or moro
defined parties. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
$ 6 comment a (1982). Quasi in
rern jurisdiction of the first type is used most frequently "in actions to partition land,
quiet title, or foreclose mortgages." Silberman, supra note 3, at 39. What distinguishes
quasi in rern jurisdiction of the first type from in rern jurisdiction is that in rern jurisdiction determines ownership of property as against the whole world, while a quasi in rern
jurisdiction judgment applies only to defined parties. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199 11.17.
The second, and by far the more controversial type, general dispute jurisdiction,
involves the use of property not to determine its ownership, but rather to serve as tho
basis for the litigation of some other dispute between the parties. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 8(l)(d) (1982). A distinguishing characteristic of quasi in rern jurisdiction of the second type is that with it the plaintiff concedes the defendant's ownership of
the attached property, and uses that ownership as the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. Shaffer,433 US.. at 199 n.17.
In personam jurisdiction refers to obtaining judicial power over a person such that
the judgment is fully binding and enforceable against him or her. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 5 Comment b (1982).
See note 198 and accompanying text infra. Attachment serves two purposes. First,
it provides a means of assuring that the defendant is given notice of the action. Second,
since jurisdiction is based on the presence of the property within the state, attachmont
provides a safeguard to the court in that it retains jurisdiction over the action throughout its adjudication. Shaffer,433 U.S. a t 198 n.16. For a discussion of the significance of
this requirement, see notes 198-222 and accompanying text infra.
If the defendant defaults, the final judgment rendered in a quasi in rom action
does not "bind the defendant to any personal liability," but only determines his liability
to the value of the thing attached. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
32(2) (1982).
If, however, the defendant enters a limited appearance, the judgment may havo an issuo
preclusion or collateral estoppel, although not a res judicata effect. Id. at 32(3); see also
Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 17-18, 112 N.E. 500,502 (1916). For a
discussion of the differing approaches to this problem, see notes 225, 227, 231 and accompanying text infra.
The term "limited appearance" refers to a procedure in which the defendant is givon
the option to appear to defend the action without exposure to full in personam liability
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fer quasi in rem jurisdiction was easier to obtain because it did
not require the minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice due process standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 necessary for in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer held that
any assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction must conform to the
International Shoe standard.1° While t.his holding may not have
been unexpected," with it "a whole citadel of precedent and tradition had fallen."'* No longer could state jurisdiction be exercised simply because a defendant's property is located within
the state.
Although the old "presence of property" theory for quasi in
rem jurisdiction was rejected, little else could be determined
with certainty from the Shaffer opinion. In the immediate aftermath, commentators pondered Shaffer's tea leaves with great intensity.13 Some argued that Shaffermeant that quasi in rem juin the event that the plaintiff prevails. In other words, with n limited nppmnnce, the
defendant can litigate the claim, but exposure is confined to the vnlue of the property.
Whether or not to grant a limited appearance has varied with state prncticc. Aside from
an occasional suggestion to the contrary, Simpson v. Laehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,311,234
N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,637 (1967), limited oppenrnnces hnve not been considered a constitutional prerequisite for the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Silbermnn,
supra note 3, a t 67 11.185.
In those jurisdictions that do not recognize a limited nppenrnnce, the defendant
faces an unpleasant choice. He can default in which case the judgment would be wtistied
out of the property, but the judgment would not extend beyond thnt even if the clnim
exceeded its value. Or, the defendant could appear, but if he did his potentinl linbility
increased beyond the value of the property to the full extent of the proven claim.
Thus, with or without a limited appearance, a quasi in rem nction, by dehition,
presents the possibility of multiple litigation on the same clnim, nn exception to the
otherwise firm rule against it. See, e.g., Allen v. hlcCurry, 449 US. 90, 94 (19801 (The
doctrine of res judicata preventing relitigation of the same c h i n serves to "relieve p x ties of the cost and vexation of multiple la~asuits,conserve[s] judicinl resources, and by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on ndjudicntion."). For a discussion of the significance of this facet of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see text ommp3nying
notes 223-31 infra.
International Shoe Co. v. Ilrashiigton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of
International Shoe, see notes 40-44 and accompanying text infra.
l o Shuffer, 433 U.S. a t 212. For a discussion of this standnrd, see notes 40,44,235
and accompanying text infra.
l1 The demise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, a t least as it hnd been trnditionnlly used,
had been predicted for some time. Silberman, supra note 3, nt 65.
l2 Id. a t 34.
IS The outpouring of scholarly treatment of Shuffer in the first y e m after its publication is truly remarkable. Three publications, the Brooklyn Lorv Review, the Ism Low
Review, and the Washington University Law Quarterly made Shaffer the subject of symL. REV. 493 (1979); Symposium:
posia Symposium Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN
State-Court Judicial Jurisdiction After ShaEer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA
L RE%. 991 (19781;
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risdiction was effectively dead." Others claimed that quasi in
rem jurisdiction could continue, but in an altered state.l"til1
others, relying on the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and
Stevens,16 saw Shaffer as a very limited holding that would not
destroy the traditional use of quasi in rem jurisdiction so long as
the property attached was concrete and physically located in a
particular state, unlike the rather ephemeral stock certificates
that were the basis for jurisdiction in Shaffer.17
The great outpouring of commentary on Shaffer occurred
before there was time for its effect to be truly assessed in the
courts.lS However, the past thirteen years have allowed the dust
Symposium: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH.
UL.Q. 273. A partial listing
of the Articles that appeared in the first three years after Shafferinclude the following:
Casad, Shaffer v. Heitnec An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN.
L. REV.61 (1977);Chase, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Social Context: Some Thoughts
L. REV.617 (1979);Lowenfeld,In Search of the Intanon a New Statute, 45 BROOKLYN
gible: A Comment on Shafferv. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.102 (1978);Moore, Procedural
Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions After Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM.& MARY L. REV.
157 (1978);Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey of its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GONZ.
L. REV.72 (1977);Reese, Shafferv. Heitner: Implications for the Doctrine
of Seider v. Roth, 63 IOWA L. REV.1023 (1978);Riesenfeld, Shder v. Heitner: Holding,
Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTXNGSL.J. 1183 (1979);Slomanson, Real Property Unrelated to Claim: Due Process for Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 83 DICKL. REV.51 (19781
79);Smit, The Importance of Shafferv. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal, 46 BROOKLYN
L.
REV.519 (1979);Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of Shafferv. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV.997 (1978);Younger, Quasi in Rem Defaults
L. REV.675 (1979);
After Shafferv. Heitner: Some Unanswered Questions,45 BROOKLYN
L.Q. 15 (1978);Note, MinZammit, Refiections on Shafferv. Heitner, 5 HAsTXNcs CONST.
imum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory in New York: The Effect of ShafFer v. Heitner, 42 ALB.L. REV.294 (1978)[hereinafterNote, Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional
Theory];Comment, Shafferv. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment, Jurisdiction Based on Property and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up
L. REV.323 (1978);Comment, Quasi in Rem on the
the Ghost of the Rest, 27 BUFFALO
., 46 FORD HA^^ L. REV.469
Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits
(1977);Comment, The Assertion of Jurisdiction Based Upon Attachment After Shaffor
v. Heitner: A Model Statute, 16 WAKEFOREST L. REV.377 (1980);Comment, State Court
L. REV.
Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heitner: The Lingering Problems, 15 WILLAMEITE
281 (1979).
There also has been commentary on whether or not Shafferupset fedord admiralty
jurisdiction, a debate that remains unresolved. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3.
Casad, supra note 13, at 78; Farrell, Civil Practice, 1977 Survey of New York
Law, 29 SYRACUSE
L. REV.449,450-61 (1978).
" Chase, supra note 13, at 627-32; Silberman, supra note 3, at 71-76; Note, Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, at 305-07.
Ie Shaffer,433 U.S. at 217 (Powell,J., concurring);id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
l7 See, e.g., Smit, supra note 13, at 523-24.
l8 While Shafferwas primarily directed to assertions of state court jurisdiction, foderal courts also play a role in this area since often these issues arise in diversity jurisdic-

..
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from Shaffer to settle. Therefore, this is a good time to take a
fresh look a t quasi in rem jurisdiction to assess the real impact
of Shaffer and to determine whether its continued use makes
sense. This Article contains the first national survey of the postShaffer use of quasi in rem jurisdiction.le The survey reveals
that a new theory for the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction is devel0ping.2~New York courts, followed so far by a small number
of other states, have used this new theory to justify the continued use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in a wide variety of large
commercial and tort cases.21 The new approach stands in sharp
contrast to that of the majority of states where quasi in rem jurisdiction is no longer in use, notwithstanding enabling legislat i ~ n A. ~danger
~
inherent in the emerging minority doctrine is
that it will be accepted uncritically in states that have neither
repealed the enabling legislation, nor afiirmatively rejected it by
appellate decision.
This Article closely examines the rationale offered for the
new quasi in rem jurisdiction, and concludes that it cannot withCourts have explained that the new thestand careful analy~is.2~
ory of quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary to fill gaps in the
state's long arm statute. However, gaps in a long arm sGtute can
be filled by legislative amendments which can provide in personam jurisdiction up to the full extent permitted by due process. In fact, long arm statutes have steadily expanded over the
last decade to take up the slack left by Shaffer. In personam

tion cases using state law. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text infra.
Even though information as to the real impact of Shaffer on state jurisdictional
practices has been available for several years, i t has not been reported or nnnlJ-zed. If
nothing else, the great deluge of ShafferArticles immediately nfter the w e n.as decided.
but not since, proves that legal scholarship, like any other human endenvor, "is raponsive to fashions." Crampton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO.LJ. 1. 14 (1936).
For civil procedure buffs in the period from 1978 to 1980 the "current fad" w p Sh"cfTer.
S i c e then the fad has moved elsewhere. See, e.g., R. h h c u s , hf. REDl~ili& E S ~ i m u m ,
C m PROCEDURE
A MODERN
APPROACH
96 (1989) (''[an the lnst decode them has been
much enthusiasm for findiig alternatives to in-court resolution of disputes. [Tjhe literature on ADR has mushroomed to substantial proportions, and there are several legal
periodicials devoted entirely to this subject"); Resnick, hianagerial Judges, 96 HARK L
REV.374 (1982) (critically evaluating the trend away from the traditional role of judicinl
decision making by using judges to aggressively manage and control doeketsl.
20 See text accompanying notes 134-74 infra.
See notes 134-57 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 104-32 and accompanying text infra.
2s See notes 198-274 and accompanying text infra.
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jurisdiction under a long arm statute is far preferable to the new
quasi in rern jurisdiction. Indeed, given its reliance on attachment, its limited res judicata effect, and its vague and uncertain
the new quasi in rern jurisdiction may very well be
unconstitutional and is surely bad policy. Moreover, the manner
in which the new quasi in rern jurisdiction has been unilaterally
forged by courts violates separation of powers.a5 This Article argues, therefore, that state courts should not succumb to the
temptation to embrace the new quasi in rern jurisdiction, and
that it should be repudiated in New York and the other states
that follow it.
. This Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the
development of quasi in rern jurisdiction, and examines the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer. Part I1 surveys the use of
quasi in rern jurisdiction in the states since Shaffer. It traces
and analyzes the growth of the new quasi in rern jurisdiction
doctrine, considers the causes of this development, and contrasts
the new doctrine with the developments in the large majority of
states that have not used quasi in rern jurisdiction since Shaffer.
Part I11 considers the contemporary validity of quasi in rern jurisdiction, and demonstrates that it is no longer a valid jurisdictional device. The Article concludes that the new quasi in rern
jurisdiction threatens to resuscitate a doctrine that, after honorable service, deserves retirement.

I. A BRIEFHISTORY
OF QUASI
IN REMJURISDICTION
AND Shaffer
v. Heitner
Quasi in rern jurisdiction in America is often traced to the
Supreme Court's 1877 opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff,acbut its
'' See notes 198-239and accompanying text infra.
See text accompanying notes 240-74infra.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,724 (1878),is "often credited as being the basis of
our conceptual framework of. . .quasi in rern jurisdiction." Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem JUrisdiction: Outmoded and ~nconstitutional?,49 ST.JOHN'S L. REV.668, 688 (1975). Its
real significance, however, lies in the fact that Pennoyer raised the tripartite distinctions
between in rem, quasi in rern and in personam jurisdiction to "a level of constitutional
significance which they neither previously enjoyed nor, perhaps, deserved!' Id.
Pennoyer itself dealt with an in personam claim that arose while the decedent was a
resident of the forum state. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 715-16.However, in the Supreme Court
quasi in rern jurisdiction was relied upon since the defendant, who was no longer a resident of the state when the action was brought, owned property in the state. The diffrculty with the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction was twofold: first, a t tho time tho
26

28
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roots can be found in far earlier times. To understand what has
happened with quasi in rem jurisdiction in the decade since
Shaffer,it is important first to know why it developed, how it
was used, and what its practical and doctrinal underpinnings
were. It is also important to review criticisms of the doctrine
that emerged in the period prior to Shaffer,as well as the facts
and holding of the Shaffer opinion itself. This section briefly
considers these questions.

A. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in America
1. The Practical and Doctrinal Need
Quasi in rem jurisdiction was well established in Great Britain when the first English settlers arrived in A~nerica.~'During
the first decade of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, however, it
was not used. Colonists who financed their beginnings in the
action was commenced the defendant did not own the property, Perdue, Sin, Scandal,
and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsider*.' 62
WMH. L REV. 479,485 n.45 (1987), and second, the property was never attached. PenIzoyer, 95 U.S.a t 728. Thus, the Court's endorsement of quasi in rem jurisdiction was, to
some extent, backhanded since the Court disapproved the manner of its w e in the caw
before it.
" At common law, quasi in rem jurisdiction was not used in quite the m e way as i t
developed in America. Jurisdiction in England required both service of p r o m s on the
defendant within the confines of the jurisdiction, and an a c t d appeamnca by the defendant. Default judgments were not recognized until 1725, and then only tentatively. It
was not until 1845 that default judgments were "unqualifiedly" permitted in the modern
manner. Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions a t Common Law and the Power Doc
trine, 78 YALEU.52, 79, 92 (1968) [hereinafter Levy, hiesne Procm]. Attachment,
therefore, in the early common law was used primarily to compel a defendnnt to appeor.
If he did not, the property reverted to the Crown. Id. a t 60.
A closer corollary to the American use of quasi in rem jurisdiction was the prnctica
of attachment that developed in the Lord hlayor's Court in London in the Mteenth century.There, beginning as early as 1419, attachment v2as used to obtain jurisdiction over u
debtor who incurred the debt within the jurisdiction, but who did not respond to attempts a t personal service of process. Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment
Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the English Experience, 5 COW. L REV.399,406-10 (1972-73) [hereinafter Levy, Attachment]. See also R
supra note 4, a t 482.
Although close in form to the quasi in rem jurisdiction that developed in the United
States, the London practice varied in that the London device did not gmttt extm temtorial jurisdiction -it was limited to claim that arose within the boundaries of the City of
London. Id. a t 481 n.1. In addition, i t was a substitute for in personnm juridiction. That
is to say, it could only be obtained when in personam jurisdiction was not passible bacause the defendant could not be located for service of process. Id. Curiously, therefore,
Shaffer, which moves quasi in rem jurisdiction closer to in personnm jurisdiction, is more
true to the spirit of the common law history than was Pennoyer.
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new world through credit were considered good risks. This was
primarily because of the relative prosperity of the times. Additionally, the colonial community was homogeneous, and the colonists assumed that those few settlers who fell behind in their
payments would respond voluntarily to proceedings brought by
their ~ r e d i t o r s . ~ ~
These halcyon days quickly ended, however, as rapid
changes swept the colonies. Within the first decade of settlement, population grew in size and diversity, the frontier was
pushed further into the interior, and the first economic depression hit.29 Because credit had been abundant, this depression
had a devastating impact. Scores of pioneer debtors defected to
new settlements in the vast wilderness, leaving their property
behind. Poor transportation and communication among the colonies made it virtually impossible to find the fleeing debtors.80
When creditors began calling in the debts, the debtors did not
respond. Since there was no way to compel a debtor's appearance, creditors needed a remedy. Quasi in rem jurisdiction,
which was part of the English legal tradition from which the colonists had come, fit the bill.31 Quasi in rem jurisdiction gave
creditors a forum for the adjudication of their claims, and a
means to obtain at least partial satisfaction of their judgments.
Thus, in 1641, the first American quasi in rem jurisdiction law
28 During the first decade of the settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony there
were only a thousand settlers. The Colony was made up of a series of "small self-contained agricultural agricultural communities whose inhabitants were united in purpose
by a mixture of religious and political philosophy and by the common need to survive in
a new and hostile environment." Kalo, Jurisdiction as a n Evolutionary Process: The
Development of Quasi in Rem and I n Personam Principles, 1978 DUKEL.J. 1147, 1160.
In this close knit setting with people bound together "by a strong sense of community,
common religious beliefs and the mutual need to survive" a summons "was d l that was
reasonably required to make the system work adequately." Id. at 1153.
20 Id. a t 1155. The depression was made worse for creditors by the fifteen fold increase in population in one decade bringing in people "with differing attitudes and boliefs." Id. at 1156. As a result, the "economic and social cohesiveness" of the earlier time
was gone. This increased the risk of default. Id.
In early colonial America, communication flowed directly from each colony to tho
mother country. Because the transportation network was undeveloped, there was little
inter-colonial intercourse. Id. "Overland transportation was not only difficult, expensive
and time consuming, but also dangerous." Sea travel was "unpredictable." Id. a t 1166-67.
See note 27 supra. I t is no mystery why the colonists borrowed from English law.
They had, of course, come from there, and equally as important "[olnly England had a
A HISsupply of law that American lawyers could use without translation." L. FRIEDMAN,
TORY OF AMERICAN
LAW34 (2d ed. 1985).
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was passed.32 The practical need for quasi in rern jurisdiction
continued well into the nineteenth century. As long as huge sections of the continent were underdeveloped, and transportation
and communication among its far flung parts remained prirnitive, quasi in rern jurisdiction provided an important and practical procedural recourse for creditors who otherwise would have
been unable to find a forum for their claims. These conditions
were so common that every state passed a law providing for
quasi in rern jurisdi~tion.~~
In its heyday, there was another reason why quasi in rern
jurisdiction was so appealing. Until the middle of the fmentieth
century, jurisdiction over defendants in state court actions was
rigidly controlled by the "power" doctrine enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer u. Neff.=' Under that
doctrine, a state lacked authority to enter an in personam judgment against a defendant who was not present in the jurisdiction at the time of service, unless the defendant was a citizen of
the state, or had consented to suit?5 The Pennoyer doctrine sea Kalo, supra note 28, a t 1158-59. The Colony a t first tried the old dommon lnw
system of attachment to compel the defendant's appearance, but i t was not suited to the
conditions then prevailing. Id. a t 1160.
It is hardly surprising that attachment jurisdiction of the London variety c;ns developed in these conditions. As Professor Levy has opined:
In every society in which credit transactions have existed - and thnt include3
virtually every civilized society creditors have been troubled by the depnrture for parts unknown of persons to whom they hnve made l o r n or to whom
they have sold goods on credit. . . Thus, i t is only natural that such societies
should develop the means whereby local creditors can reach with dipatch any
assets their departed debtors may have left behind. Such was the case of the
early Law Merchant, and such was the case in London ,
Levy, Attachment, supra note 27, a t 405.
SS R. MELAR,supra note 4, a t 486; Kalo, supra note 28, nt 1161; Silbermnn, supra
note 3, a t 43. Indeed, quasi in rern jurisdiction became so established in the United
States that one observer could report that "attachments became pnrt of the g e n e d pattern of business practices." R ~ ~ L A supra
R ,
note 4, a t 486 (quoting R ~ ~ O P Z W
LTRODUCTION TO SELECTCASESOF THE ~ ~ A Y O R ' SCOURTOF NEW YORKCITY, 1674-1780 19-20
(1915)).
Although quasi in rern jurisdiction was universally avnilnble, there were vuintions in
the states. Some states, for example, did not allow attachment ngainst nonraidents in
tort cases; others required that the defendant be a nonresident in nll situntiom in which
it could be used. For a discussion of the variations in usage of quasi in rern jurisdiction,
see R MILLAR,
supra note 4, a t 486-97.
=' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
" Justice Field derived the power theory of jurisdiction which so long ruled jurisdictional theory in the United States from Justice Story's famous Commentaries on the
Conflict of Law. Siberman, supra note 3, a t 45. It, in turn, rvas borrowed from continen-

-

.

...
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verely restricted the jurisdiction of state courts to hear claims by
citizens aggrieved by the actions of nonresidents, even if the activities that gave rise to suit took place in the state, and even if
the defendant could be found elsewhere and served. However, at
the same time that it announced constitutional limitations on
the use of in personam jurisdiction, the Pennoyer Court permitted the open-ended use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. If the nonresident defendant's property in the state was attached at the
commencement of the action, Pennoyer held that quasi in rem
jurisdiction was proper, even if in personam jurisdiction was not.
This use of quasi in rem jurisdiction spared many plaintiffs the
burden of a difficult and costly, if not impossible, trip to commence the action in the nonresident's state. Thus, quasi in rem
jurisdiction played an important doctrinal role. By loosening the
artificial straightjacket of the Pennoyer doctrine, quasi in rem
jurisdiction provided at least a "partial escape from the strictures of the territorial theory of [in personam] jurisdi~tion."~~
Pennoyer's restriction on in personam jurisdiction was
clearly out of step with the changing times.37 Rapidly improving
transportation and communications systems of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries cast serious doubt on the wisdom
of the decision. These changes meant that it was becoming more
difficult for defendants to escape service of process. At the same
time, improvements in transportation made it less burdensome
for defendants to respond to litigation brought against them in
another jurisdiction. Pennoyer perhaps worked the greatest unfairness in cases involving multi-state, corporate defendants
which conducted business on a national scale, but were able to
In the 1945 case of
use the Pennoyer doctrine to avoid

tal theories designed to regulate relationships between sovereign states in Europo. Zammit, supra note 26, a t 669. The basic idea was expressed by Justice Field in two maxims.
First, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. a t 722. Second, "no tribunal established
by [a state] can extend its process beyond that territory." Id. For a comploto description
of the doctrine and its conceptual underpinnings, see Hazard, A General Tlteory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP.CT. REV.241. For a fascinating history of this sominal case, see Perdue, supra note 26, at 479-90.
SB Zammit, supra note 26, at 670.
37 See, e.g., J. LANDERS,
J. MARTIN& S. YEAZELL,
CIVILPROCEDURE
73 (2d od. 1988)
("Pennoyer [was attacked because it] had its feet planted in a preindustrial world!').
38 See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and thc I n
Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts - From Pennoyer to Denckla, 25 U. CHI.L.
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International Shoe Co. u. Washington,SBthe Supreme Court
sought to bring jurisdictional theory more in line with the times.
The resulting opinion ultimately served as the basis for a challenge t o quasi in rem jurisdiction itself.
2. International Shoe Co. u. Washington and the Trans-

formation of American Jurisdictional Law

In International Shoe, the Court held that physical presence of the defendant was no longer required for the assertion of
in personam jurisdiction. Rather, due process is satisfied so long
as the nonresident had "minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "O' International Shoe had a profound effect on jurisdictional law.
The most immediate effect was that it unleashed a movement to
expand in personam jurisdiction well beyond that which was
possible under the Pennoyer doctrine. By the early 1960s this
movement culminated in every state having a long arm statute."
REV. 569, 577-86 (1958).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'O Id. a t 316 (quoting hlilliken v. hfeyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). In o subequent
opinion, the Court made clear that the expansion of notions of in peroennm jurisdiction
was a consequence of the "increasing nationalization of commerce" and of "modern
transportation and communications systems [that] have mode i t much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend h i e l f in a State where he engages in economic nctivit~*."
McGee v. International L i e Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
However, replacing the simple-to-apply presence test of Pennoyer with the more
free floating minimum contacts due process standard of International Shoe also hnd the
effect of launching the Court and commentators on a journey into the mpteries of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants from which no one h n yet
~ returned. I t
was much easier for the Court to reject the rigid applicntion of the Pennoyer doctrine
than it has been to find a comprehensible replacement theory. The Court h struggled
mightily with the problem and has returned to the issue continunlly in recent years. See,
e.g., Asahi hletal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewia, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler hfagazine, Inc, 465 US. 770
(1984);Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. ivoodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). "Yet despite
this growing body of case law, the doctrinal underpinnings remnin elusive." Perdue,
supra note 26, a t 479. For a comprehensive treatment of the theoretical debate unleashed by the minimum contacts test of International Shoe, see, cg,Brilmyer, HOW
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP.CTREV.77; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV.L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARK
L. REV. 909 (1960).
For discussions of this significant development, see Currie, The Grolrth of the
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Although International Shoe had an immediate effect on in
personam jurisdiction, until Shaffer courts did not view International Shoe as disturbing the Pennoyer Court's endorsement of
quasi in rern jurisdiction. Indeed, the International Shoe opinion did not even mention quasi in rern jurisdiction. One reason
for this was that International Shoe dealt with a different question. It raised the issue of whether a state could constitutionally
assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when the defendant was not present in the state at the time of
service.42 Put another way, International Shoe dealt with
whether a use of in personam jurisdiction prohibited by Pennoyer should be permitted. By contrast, quasi in rern jurisdiction shifts the focus to whether forms of jurisdiction permitted
by Pennoyer, such as quasi in rern jurisdiction, should be prohibited. Although this is a related question, International Shoe
did not deal with it directly. Thus, it was possible to interpret
the International Shoe decision in a way that continued to authorize quasi in rern jurisdiction without ~hange,'~
which is exactly what courts did for years after the International Shoe decision was handed down. Courts continued to make use of quasi
in rern jurisdiction in the old way without serious question as to
whether a minimum contacts analysis was req~ired.'~
Although
courts did not see International Shoe as disturbing the authority for quasi in rern jurisdiction, commentators did.
3. The Pre-Shaffer Critique of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction

The major line of argument by commentators was that the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533;
Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15
L. REV. 61 (1965). For a comprehensive description of the current long arm
BUFFALO
JURISDICTION
IN CIVILACTIONS
(1983).
statutes used by the states, see R. CASAD,
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.310, 311-12 (1945).
Silberman, supra note 3, a t 51.
Id. a t 35 n.4 (collecting cases). Prior to Shaffer, state courts almost routinely up.
held quasi in rern jurisdiction "without discussing the applicability" of the minimum
contacts standard. Id. Only three courts had considered the question, and all three had
"expressly decided not to apply the International Shoe standard to quasi in rern jurisdiction." Id.
Prior to 1963 when Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amendod
to permit the use of attachment actions in federal courts, a quasi in rem jurisdiction
action could not be brought originally in these courts even in a diversity action. C.
WRIGHT,FEDERAL
COURTS
424-25 (4th ed. 1983).
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unbridled use of quasi in rern jurisdiction allowed plaintiffs to
secure jurisdiction over nonresident defendants even when it
was unfair.46 As Dean Carrington noted: "In the light of the
emerging concept of personal jurisdiction, the quasi in rern procedure is rarely useful to plaintiffs except in cases which the defendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen by .
the
This argument was fortified by the extremes to
which courts had pushed quasi in rern jurisdiction." For example, in Harris v.
the Supreme Court upheld the use of
quasi in rern jurisdiction over a nonresident whose only contact
with the state was a visit there by his debtor. There was no indication that litigation in the defendant's home state would have
been onerous, or that the presence of such intangible property as
the defendant's debtor in the forum state was anything more
than happenstan~e.'~Some courts had taken the Harris doctrine
even further in the 1960s, when they held quasi in rern jurisdiction could be used to permit a plaintiff to at9ch a nonresident's
insurance policy to litigate a personal injury action even though
the claim arose outside the state, and the defendant had no contacts with the forum state other than ownership of the policy.60
The major critics were: Carrington, The hfodern Utility of Quasi I n Rent JurisL REV. 303 (1962); Von hlehren 6:Trautmnn, supra noto 40; Znmmit,
diction, 76 HARV.
supra note 26; Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the FundamenL REV. 300 (1970); Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A
tal Test of Fairness, 69 MXCH.
Proposed Reform, 69 C o ~ u aL
t REV. 1412 (1969). Supporters were few m d far between.
For one see Smit, The Enduring Utility of I n Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer
v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 600 (1977).
46 Carrington, supra note 45, a t 306. Professor Carrington for this reason called
quasi in rern jurisdiction an "antique device." Id. a t 303. In the words of mother commentator, quasi in rern jurisdiction was a "jurisdictional mjztique." Comment, supra
note 45, a t 325. Still another referred to quasi in rern jurisdiction ns a "vestigial concept" Note, supra note 45, a t 1422.
47 See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
" 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
48 In Harris, both Harris and Balk were residents of North Carolina Hnrris owed
Balk $180. Balk was indebted to Jawb Epstein, a hfnryland resident, for 2300. \ W e
Harris was temporarily visiting hlaryland, Epstein brought a quasi in rem jurisdiction
action against Balk by obtaining a writ of attachment agoinst Harris. Id. a t 216. His
theory was that Harris physically carried hi indebtedness to Bnlk wherever he troveled.
Id. a t 218. Harris, after he paid his debt to Balk over to Epstein, clnimed thnt he hod
satisfied his debt, and it was this rather extreme contention thnt wns upheld by the
United States Supreme Court. Id. a t 222. For an intriguing history of this sogn of "the
power theory [at] its zenith," see Silberman, supra note 3, at 49; Lowenfeld, supra note
13, a t 104-07.
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312,269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider,
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The critique of these cases was heated. Critics complained
that the property that formed the predicate for quasi in rem jurisdiction had no relationship to the dispute. First, they argued
that the property attached, a debt in Harris for example, was
intangible; and only in the most metaphysical sense could it be
said that this property had been brought into the state intent i o n & ~ . Second,
~~
even if one could surmount that problem,
there was still the difficulty of attributing the debtor's intention
to the creditor over whom jurisdiction is sought.6a
Critics also contended that the unfairness was compounded
by ex parte attachment used to obtain quasi in rem jurisdict i ~ n Attachment
.~~
gave plaintiffs an added procedural weapon
by tying up the defendant's property while litigation was pending.64 This criticism took on added significance with the Supreme Court's 1972 opinion in Fuentes u. S h e ~ i nIn
. ~Fuentes,
~
the Court held that pre-judgment seizure of the personal property of a debtor in a replevin action must be accompanied by
procedural due process protections. Although the Fuentes Court
did not deal with the use of attachment for jurisdictional purp o s e ~ ,its
~ ~holding, and that of its progeny, cast doubt on
whether the ex parte attachment procedure for quasi in rem juthe plaintiffs, who were New York residents, sued a Quebec defendant in Now York state
court for injuries arising out of an automobile accident in Vermont. Although there was
no basis on these facts for in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff sought to obtain quasi
in rem jurisdiction by attaching the defendant's auto insurance policy, which was with a
company that was located in New York. The New York Court of Appeals upheld tho
attachment on the ground that the insurance company's obligation to the defendant was
a debt that could form the basis for jurisdiction. The court's ruling that the situs of a
debt is the physical location of the debtor followed logically from Harris U. Balk, but tho
extreme result that it yielded in that case was harshly criticized by commentators. See,
e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction ouer Non-Residents
New York
. .J.118 (1968);Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many
Goes Wild, 35 INS. C o u ~ sL
or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUM.
L. REV.660 (1971); Comment, supra
note 45, a t 325-38;Note, supra note 45, a t 1422-25.
O' The criticisms of Seider were particularly extensive and severe. See generally
Reese, supra note 13; Rosenberg, supra note 50.
OZ Indeed, with the birth of the Seider doctrine in 1966, some state courts took tho
doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction to new heights notwithstanding International Shoe.
OS Attachment has long been assumed to be a sina qua non of quasi in ram jurisdiction. See note 198 and accompanying text infra. Prior to Fuentes, it was almost always
granted ex parte. Fuentes changed that. See notes 131-32,200 and accompanying text
infra.
Zammit, supra note 26, a t 679.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
O-ee
note 206 and accompanying text infra.

-
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risdiction could ~ontinue.~'
Finally, critics pointed out that the
use of quasi in 1.m jurisdiction was "at odds with the modern
concept of res j ~ d i c a t a . "Whenever
~~
the device was used to lay
claim to property of less value than the plaintms total damages,
there was an ever present possibility of repeated litigation in
several jurisdictions over the same claim.6B
To be sure, there were defenders of quasi in rem jurisdiction. They pointed out that quasi in rem jurisdiction could aid
the judgment creditor who was seeking to enforce an out-of-state
judgment against a recalcitrant defendant who has property in
the enforcing state.60They also argued that it provided security
for a plaintiff suing a defendant who might secrete or dissipate
assets.s1 Finally, proponents of quasi in rem jurisdiction contrasted International Shoe's vague "minimum contacts," "fair
play," and "substantial justice" standards with the much clearer
standard.needed for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Under the old
standards, quasi in rem jurisdiction was prpper so long as the
property was present in the state.s2 This clear standard, proponents argued, avoided wasteful preliminary litigation on jurisdictional issues.ss In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court finally confronted some of the arguments for and against quasi in rem
jurisdiction, and in the process shook the foundations on which
For a more complete discussion of the Fuentes line of cases, see notes 206-22 and
accompanying text infra.
s8 Carrington, supra note 45, a t 314.
nB See notes 224-31 and accompanying text infra.
" The foremost advocate of this point of view was the American Lor? Institute. See
RE~~ATEMENT
(SECOND)
OP CONFLICT
OF LAWS$ 6 6 comment a (1971) (quoted in ShalJer,
433 U.S. a t 210).
Protecting a plaintiff against the demonstrated possibility that the defendnnt by
stealth will depreciate the plaintiffs abiity to realistically recover the judgment, is one
of the original purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See notes 27-32 and ocmmpmying
text supra. But as a justification for the broad use of quasi in rem jurisdiction bawd
simply on the presence of the defendant's property it sweeps too broadly. One commentator, seeing the "possible injustice" of this justification for qunsi in rem jurisdiction,
wrote: "The difficulty with such a rationale is that the defendant moy not bo attempting
to evade his creditors by owning property in another state. Unless proof of such conduct
is required, the rationale actually means that evasion is presumed in order to assert jurisdiction." Developments in the Law, supra note 40, a t 955; see also Carrington, supra
note 45, a t 307-08.
See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
" Carrington, supra note 45, a t 309. See also Smit, supra note 45, o t 612 ("[Tjhe
essential inquiry necessary to determine whether there is judicial [quosi in rem] jurisdiction is relatively simple.").

Heinonline - - 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1073 1989-1990

1074

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

the doctrine had stood for centuries.

B. ShafTer v. Heitner
Shaffer v. Heitner was a shareholders' derivative action
filed in Delaware state court by Arnold Heitner, the owner of
one share of the Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation. Heitner alleged that mismanagement of the corporation by
its officers led to two legal proceedings, a civil antitrust action,
and a criminal contempt proceeding, which cost the company
over thirteen and one half million dollars in fines and damages.04
Heitner brought suit in Delaware even though the corporation's
headquarters were in Arizona, the activities of the directors occurred in Oregon, and none of the defendant directors resided or
did business in Delaware.
The action was brought under a Delaware sequestration
statute that allowed a plaintiff to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant without prior notice by obtaining a court
order to attach the defendant's property. Plaintiff was able to
obtain the order because Delaware law mandated that the state
of Delaware would be deemed the situs of all of the stock of
Delaware corporations, even if the stock certificates were not
physically located in the state.65The defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the sequestration law violated procedural due process, and that under International Shoe the
state court lacked jurisdiction because there were no minimum
contacts between defendants and Delaware. However, the Delaware courts upheld jurisdiction, focusing on the procedural due
process issue.e6
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the five member
majority:' Justice Marshall dealt only with the defendants' cone' Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 189-90. One action was an anti-trust proceeding in Oregon in
which a judgment of $13,146,090 plus attorney fees was assessed; the other was a criminal contempt proceeding in Illinois that led to a fine of $100,000 to Greyhound and
$500,000 to Greyhound Lines. Id. a t 190 nn.2-3.
Id. a t 192. Apparently, Delaware is the only state with such a statute. Note, Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, a t 297 n.30 (citing Appollant's
Brief on the Merits, a t 27 n.14).
Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 193-95. The state court dealt with defendant's basis argument in just two paragraphs. The court relied on the long history of quasi in rem jurisdiction to render the argument not "significant." Greyhound Corp. v. Heitnor, 361 A.2d
225, 229 (Del. 1976).
B' Justice Marshall's opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
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tention that the plaintws use of quasi in rern jurisdiction could
not be reconciled with the fairness standard of International
Shoe.6s The Court acknowledged that although International
Shoe had dramatically changed the law regarding in personam
jurisdiction, "[nlo equally dramatic change has occurred in the
law governing jurisdiction in rem."6Q Undertaking a long postponed examination of quasi in rern jurisdiction, the Court concluded that it is "an ancient form without substantial modern
justificati~n."~~
Since jurisdiction over a thing is no different
than "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,'*l the
standard of International Shoe must be used to determine
whether jurisdiction is appropriate regardless of the type of jurisdiction in~oked.?~
The Shaffer Court also addressed the arguments of those
who supported the old method of quasi in rern jurisdiction. In
response to the argument that the old standard is necessary to
allow for enforcement of judgments, Justice"Marshall stated:
[W]e know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can
avoid paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in
which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam
judgment of one state enforceable in all other states.7J

Addressing the argument that the old quasi in rern jurisdiction
was necessary to prevent a defendant from removing assets from
the state, Marshall responded that subjecting quasi in rern jurisdiction to a minimum contacts analysis did not mean that a
state would be deprived of authority to attach property "as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigaBlackmun, Stewart, and White. Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 188. Justices Powell nnd Stevens
filed concurring opinions, id. a t 217 (Powell, J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring],
and Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part, Id. nt 219 (Brennnn, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the
decision. Id. a t 217. Thus, it took four opinions for the eight justices who participated to
explain the result.
" The Court specifically reserved the procedural due process kue. Id. nt 189.
6e Id. a t 205.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 207.
7 x The Court noted that the lines separating quasi in rern jurisdiction, in per6onnm
jurisdiction, and in rern jurisdiction were not always clear. Id. a t 201.
7s Id. at 210.
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tion can be maintained consistently with International Shoe."74
The Court was also unpersuaded that history confirmed the conFinally, Justice Marstitutionality of quasi in rem juri~diction.7~
shall disposed of the argument that whatever its sins, quasi in
rem jurisdiction had the benefit of being governed by clear
standards:
[Tlhe fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily applied in
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, when the existence of jurisdiction in a particular forum under International Shoe is unclear, the
cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of "fair play and substantial justice." That
cost is too high.76

The Court indicated that evaluating all forms of jurisdiction according to minimum contacts analysis would not change the result of many ca~es.7~
It is primarily when quasi in rem jurisdiction was used in situations like Harris o. Balk that the Court
thought "significant" changes would 0ccur.7~The Shaffer Court
acknowledged that the presence of the defendant's property in a
particular state might suggest "other ties among the defendant,
However, the Court ruled that
the state and the litigati~n."~~
when "the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action,"s0 the mere presence of
the defendant's property within a particular state would not be
Id.
To this argument the Court replied that constitutional rights "can be as readily
offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by tho
adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage." Id. a t 212.
l BId. at 211.
77 In rem jurisdiction, for example, in which the plaintiff seeks to establish his titlo
to property located within the state as against the entire world, would still be permissible, since almost by definition in such cases the requisite minimum contacts would be
present. Id. at 207-08. This is so because in an in rem proceeding the state has a woighty
interest in ensuring the marketability of title and in providing a procedure for "peacoful
resolution of disputes about the possession of that property." Id. a t 208. In addition, tho
defendant's claim to the property reveals that he expects to benefit from the state's protection of his interest which provides the required purposeful availment that is necessary
for minimum contacts to be present. Id. a t 207-08. Moreover, in quasi in rom cases of tho
first type the same result would almost invariably be reached since the proceeding would
involve a disputed claim to property, and both claimants by definition would have established voluntary contacts with the forum state. Id. a t 208.
Id.
78 Id. a t 209.
Id.
7'

76
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enough, by itself, to support jurisdi~tion.~'
In such cases, the defendants' property is being used to coerce defendantsypresence
in the state, and such an "indirect assertion" of jurisdiction violates due process "if a direct assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant would violate the C~nstitution."~~
Because it did not
find minimum contacts in the case before it, the Shaffer Court
reversed the decision of the Delaware Superior
Justices Powell and Stevens wrote separate concurrences
qualiing the majority's more sweeping view of the effect of applying minimum contacts analysis to quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Both justices concluded that simple ownership of tangible property was sufficient to constitutionally confer jurisdiction, although each reached that result by a different r ~ u t e Justice
.~
Brennan, concurring in part, and dissenting in part, added a
fourth opinion to the c a c o p h ~ n y . ~ ~
Id.
Id. The significance of this statement is not readily apparent since there is no
provision in Delaware law for a limited appearance. Id. a t 195 n.12.
BS The Court held that the facts in the case were not sufficient to justify jurisdiction
under the constitutional standard of Intermtioml Shoe since the property attached ria
not the subject matter of the litigation, and the claim did not relate to the property or
arise out of it. Id. a t 213. The Court further relied on the fact thnt the defendants hnd
never set foot in Delaware, nor could they reasonably have been aware thnt by accepting
the position of director of the corporation that they mere subjecting themselves to the
jurisdiction of that state's courts. Id. a t 213-16.
Justice Powell stressed the importance of avoiding the "uncertainty s f the general
International Shoe standard" that mould result from subjecting rill dnims for quasi in
rem jurisdiction to an open-ended minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 217 (Po~ell,J.,
concurring). He indicated that it might be appropriate to bnse qunsi in rem jurisdiction
on the simple "ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably nnd
permanently located within a state . . . without more." Id.
Justice Stevens reached the same result via a d i e r e n t route. Relying upon Justice
Black's opinion in International Shoe, International Shoe v. \Yashington, 326 Us$.310,
324 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.). he posited that the essential purpose of the minimum
contacts test is to give "fair warning that a particular activity mny subject o person to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 218 (Stevens, J., concurringl.
While ownership of intangible property such as shares of stock in a corporation v ~ a snot
e
could
sufficient to provide such notice, ownership of more tangible property. w h ~ z situs
be easily located, is: "If I visit another State or acquire r e d estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my
property or my person while there. hfy contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise
to predictable risks." Id.
Id. a t 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's opinion applauded the majority's substitution of minimum contacts mdj-sisfor
the old presence test as "a far more sensible construct for the e x e r c h of state-court
jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual fictions thnt hove been generated
from the decision in Pennoyer u. Neff." Id. But Justice Brennnn wns willing on tho fncb
82
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C. Whither Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction After Shaffer?

Shaffer confirmed the demise of the old rationales for quasi
in rern jurisdiction, and raised important questions about its future. Historically, quasi in rern jurisdiction had rested on two
pillars - one practical and the other theoretical - both of
which had crumbled by the time of Shaffer. In a developing
country settled on the edge of a vast wilderness, possessing a
limited transportation network, and poor means of establishing
contact with persons who did not reside in the local community,
quasi in rern jurisdiction served the important practical purpose
of allowing creditors to obtain some redress for their losses.80
Without it, plaintiffs would often have been unable to litigate
claims because they could not locate defendants. Nineteenth
century jurisdiction doctrine also encouraged the development
of quasi in rern jurisdiction to counteract the rigors of Pennoyer
U. Neff.s7
By the time of Shaffer, both supports had eroded. No
longer did transportation and communication seriously limit
plaintiffs' ability to seek out and serve nonresident defendantsOaa
Similarly, thirty-two years after International Shoe had "released state courts from the territorial power concept of jurisdictionnseimposed by Pennoyer, and permitted them to assert full
in personam power over any nonresident who has established
minimum contacts with the forum, it was difficult to contend
that quasi in rern jurisdiction played an important doctrinal
role. By cutting quasi in rern jurisdiction loose from its old
moorings, Shaffer confirmed that too much had changed since
Pennoyer to justify continuing to think about quasi in rern jurisdiction in the same way. At the very least, Shaffer forced a rethinking of the basis for the continued use of the doctrine.D0
presented to find that the defendants had established minimum contacts with the forum
state. Id. a t 222-28.
For a discussion of the historic antecedents of quasi in rem jurisdiction, seo notos
26-33 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of these limitations, see notes 34-36 and accompanying toxt
supra.
See notes 37-40,44 and accompanying text supra.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX.L. REV.657 (1969).
After Shaffer, if quasi in rern jurisdiction is to occupy a legitimate niche in tho
current legal landscape, it is incumbent on its supporters to propose a modern rationale
for its continued use. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said over eighty years ago:
I t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
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The Shaffer Court's fractured opinion "bristle[d] with perple~ities,"~'however, and left few clear guideposts for establishing a new theory for quasi in rem jurisdiction. The opinion itself
led some to wonder whether quasi in rem jurisdiction was still
constituti~nal.~~
The Shaffer Court clearly had not mandated, in
so many words, the abolition of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it was quite possible to discern a death knell for quasi in
rem jurisdiction resonating from the tone of the majority opinThe demise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was evinced as
much by what the Court did not say, as by what it did say. For
example, while the Court addressed the argument that the standards traditionally used for application of the doctrine were no
longer constitutionally justifiable, it did not confront, much less
answer, other major arguments of the critics of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Among the arguments that went unaddressed were
contentions that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated procedural
due pro~ess,9~
and that it was at variance with developing notions of res judicata requiring that a single claim be litigated
once in a single forum.s5 In addition, the Court did not deal with
the claim that the expansion of in personam jurisdiction made
possible by International Shoe left quasi in rem jurisdiction
constitutionally superfluous.
However, the concurrences of Justices Powell and Stevens
signaled that the opinion was susceptible of a much narrower
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L Rev. 457,469 (1897). It is not enough to say
that quasi in rem jurisdiction can be used constitutionally so long ns its use conforms to
minimum contacts standards. As Chief Justice Burger reminded us not long ngo, "dl
that is good is not commanded by the Constitution and all that is bad is not forbidden
by it." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 228 (1971).
91 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisinnn, 1965 SUP.CT. Rev. 1,
30 (describing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)).
Professor Casad, for example, wrote that Shaffer "ring[s] the death h e l l for the
use of provisional remedies [attachment] as devises for obtaining jurisdiction. The limited form of jurisdiction available through the qunsi in rern jurisdiction promhue new
can rarely, if ever, be obtained through those measures except under circumstances that
would justify broader in personam jurisdiction." R CASAD,supra note 41, nt 2-51 (1983).
BS See, e.g., id.; Farrell, supra note 14, a t 450; but see Smit, supra note 13, n t 631
("Shafferis of most limited significance . .").
" Indeed, the Court expressly reserved this issue. See note 206 and nccompmying
text infra.
95 See notes 223-231 and accompanying text infra.

..
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interpretation that would preserve quasi in rern jurisdiction in
much the way it had been used in the past. This approach would
prohibit the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction only in cases like
Shaffer, in which the attached property was intangible and was
subject to attachment in the state only because state law arbitrarily placed the property within the state's juri~diction.~~
Additionally, some commentators argued for the continued vitality
of quasi in rern jurisdiction when there was no alternative forum:'
or when there were contacts, but not enough to justify
full in personam jurisdi~tion.~~
Nevertheless, the clear majority
of commentators predicted that the opinion would probably lead
to a drastic curtailment, if not elimination, of quasi in rern
jurisdi~tion.~~
In the thirteen years since Shaffer, the Supreme Court has
not helped solve the mystery.loOAside from Rush u. Sauchuk,lol
a single opinion dealing with one of the more extreme uses of
quasi in rern jurisdiction from the days prior to Shaffer, the
Court has not returned to this topic. However, the issue has percolated for a sufficient time in the state courts and the legislatures for states to have considered for themselves whether, and
88 See Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t 1189; Silberman, supra note 3, at 74-76; Smit,
supra note 13, a t 524-29.
Silberman, supra note 3, a t 76-77; Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t 1197.
See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 3, a t 71-72.
supra note 41; Chase, supra note 13; Silberman, supra note 3;
See, e.g., R. CASAD,
Zammit, supra note 13.
loo Other mysteries unresolved by Shaffer included the following questions: did tho
opinion mean that the property that is attached must be related in some way to tho
M. KANE& A. MILLER,CIVIL PROCEDURE
163.64
underlying claim? J. FRIEDENTHAL,
(1985). Would Shaffer apply to property brought into the state voluntarily and left for
substantial periods of time? Smit, supra note 13, a t 529-31. What about attachment of
property to enforce a judgment entered in another state, or to secure property from removal pending the outcome of litigation? Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t 1196-97; Silborman, supra note 3, a t 77-79; Zammit, supra note 13, a t 18-19. Did the opinion mean that
the limited appearance which permitted a person to appear and defend an action without subjecting himself to full in personam jurisdiction was now abolished? Silborman,
supra note 3, a t 67 n.185.
lo' 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, the Court invalidated the Seider doctrine undor
which quasi in rern jurisdiction was used to compel a nonresident to defend a personal
injury action in the forum state solely because his insurance company was located thoro.
The Court held that this "ingenious jurisdictional theory," id. a t 328, was unconstitutional because: "[Tlhe fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota [tho
forum state] does not, without more, provide a basis for concluding that there is any
contact in the International Shoe sense between Minnesota and the insured." Id. a t 32930.
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to what extent, they wish to reject, or to retain quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Until now, there has not been a report of how the
states have responded to Shaffer.The following section considers the current status of quasi in rem jurisdiction in the United
States.
11. QUASIIN REMJURISDICTION
IN THE STATES
AFTER Shaffer

A post-Shaffer survey of quasi in rem jurisdiction law in the
states reveals that the widely predicted retirement of quasi in
rem jurisdiction has, for the most part, come to pass. However,
there also has been an unexpected and opposing development.
New York, followed in varying degrees by nine other jurisdictions, has created a new rationale and reinvigorated life for quasi
in rem jurisdiction.lo2 The forty remaining states have not yet
endorsed this theory. Indeed, in most of these states the use of
quasi in rem jurisdiction since Shaffer has simply faded. The
diminished use of quasi in rem jurisdiction coincides with a
steady expansion of in personam jurisdiction, and a contraction
of attachment jurisdiction due to procedural due process defenses.lo3However, in the future these states may be influenced
by the new quasi in rem jurisdiction since only three of the forty
states that do not use quasi in rem jurisdiction have explicitly
rejected the doctrine through legislation or case law. It is thus
possible that this survey has detected the emergence of a new
national doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The serious constitutional and public policy questions that this new form of
quasi in rem jurisdiction presents will be explored in the final
section of this Article. First, however, this section reports the
results of the survey.
A. States That Have Rejected Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
Since Shaffer only three states have rejected quasi in rem
jurisdiction. In 1979, the Vermont state legislature amended its
attachment law to eliminate quasi in rem jurisdiction. The
change mas made:

...

to take account of the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner
that attachment of assets at the commencement of an action is no longer n con-

lo*
'OS

See notes 134-74and accompanying text infra.
See notes 129-32and accompanying text infra.
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stitutionally valid way of obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident in
the absence of any other contacts with the state
Since Vermont's long-arm statute . . stretches to the limits of due process, the
defendant's person will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in
any case in which the contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction
. . . Only if one of the other grounds for an ex parte attachment,
which involve the danger that the defendant will abscond with or imperil the security, is present will an ex parte hearing be in order.lO'

.

....

.

In Michigan, a state court declared unconstitutional the
quasi in rem law, which permitted quasi in rem jurisdiction only
when personal jurisdiction could not be obtained.lo5Since Michigan's long arm statute reached "to the farthest extent permitted by due process,"10ethe court held that the law was unconstitutional because it would allow "jurisdiction over defendants in
derogation of the minimum contacts standard."lo7 Finally, in
Nebraska, the state attachment statute108was amended to eliminate quasi in rem jurisdiction after a federal court held the attachment law unconstitutional on procedural due process

B. States That Have Not Used Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
Since Shaffer
Thirty-seven states, the great "silent majority," retain statV.R.C.P. 4.1 at 21 (amended 1979) (see Reporter's notes a t 20).
MICH.COMP.LAWSANN.3 600.401 (West 1987).
'OB City Suburban Agency v. Dade Helicopter Serv., 141 Mich. App. 241, 242, 366
N.W.2d 259, 260 (1985).
lo'
Id., 366 N.W.2d a t 261.
Ion NEB. REV.STAT.3 25-1001 (1985).
log The case was Arron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847,849 (D, Nob.
1977). In Berman, the plaintiff sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction under tho Nobraska attachment statute on the sole ground that the defendant was a nonresident of
the state. The plaintiff argued that attachment without a prior hearing or opportunity to
be heard was permissible notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuontos v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The district court disagreed, holding that "[pllaintiff has not
asserted an argument founded in reason or logic as to why procedural safeguards should
be less stringent in foreign attachment situations." Berman, 431 F. Supp. a t 852.
While the opinion required no more than a change in the statute to provide procodural safeguards should quasi in rem jurisdiction be sought, the amended attachment
statute eliminated nonresidency alone as a proper basis for attachment. The effect of tho
new statute, therefore, was to render quasi in rem jurisdiction unavailable in Nebraska
unless the plaintiff is able to show additional facts that make seizure necessary to proserve the property, such as an intent to defraud creditors, or an effort to avoid servico of
process. See NEB.REV.STAT.3 25-1001(1), (2) and (3) (1980).
lM

Ion
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utory authorization for pre-judgment attachment when the defendant is a nonresident or a foreign corp~ration."~In these
states, however, there are no opinions since Shaffer which explicitly approve quasi in rem jurisdiction."' The absence of reported cases does not necessarily mean that quasi in rem jurisdiction is not being used in these states since the statutory
authority for it has not been repealed, and most cases are not
officially reported. However, there are two reasons why it is unlikely that quasi in rem jurisdiction is enjoying continued vitality in these states.
First, in a number of states the only references found after
ALA CODE 6-6-41 to 53 (1975); ALASKA STAT. 09.40.010 (1983); ARIZ Rev.
STAT.ANN. 8 12-1570.01 (1986); ARK STAT.ANN. 16-110-402 (1987) (garnishment) and 5
16-110-101 (Mich. 1987) (attachment); CAL.[CIV.PROC]CODE5 494.010 ( W a t 1979 6:
Supp. 1989); COLO.REV.STAT.8 102 (West 1973) and lQ3 (1973 6:Supp. 1988); CONN.
GEN.STAT.ANN. 5 52-284 (West 1953); DEL CODEANN. tit. 10, § 3506 (1974); GA CODE
ANN. 8 18-3-1 (Harrison 1982 & Supp. 1988); HAW.Rev. STAT. G1-1 16 -21 (1985 6:
Supp. 1987); IDAHO
CODE$ 8-501 to -505 (1979); ILL.ANN. STAT.ch. 110 2 4-101 (SmithCODEANN. §
Hurd 1981) (attachment); IND. CODEANN. § 34-1-11-1 (\Vest 1986); IOWA
639.3 (West 1946 & Supp. 1988); KAN.CIV. PROCCODEANN. 60-701 (Vernon 1983)
(attachment); KY.REV.STAT.ANN. 3 425.301 (hlichie/Bobbs-hlerrill 1988); h l e REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14,s 1451 (West 1989); W .R CIV.P. 4.1, h k s . GEN. LAWS
ANN.ch.223,s 42
(West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. 521.010 (Vernon 1949); hiom. CODEANN. 27-18-101
(1987); NEV.REV.STAT.ANN. § 31.017 (hlichie 1953 Se. 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. a 2 6 - 2
(West 1987); N.M. STAT.ANN. 8 39-4-2 (1978); N.D. CENT.CODE 32-08-03 (Supp. 1987);
ANN.tit. 12,s 1151 OVat
OHIOREV.CODEANN. § 2715.01 (Anderson 1970); O m STAT.
1988); OR REV.STAT. 29.115 (1985). OR R CN. P. 84 A(2)(b) nnd (c); RL GEN. LAWS5
10-5-2 (1985); S.C. CODEANN. 15-19-10 (Law. Co-op. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS
ANN.
21-17A-3 (1987); TENN.
CODEANN. 29-6-101 (1980); TEx [CIV.PRAC6: REX] CODEA h i
3 16.002 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODEANN. 8.01-534 (1985); WASH. REV. CODEANN. 5
6.25.030 (Supp. 1988); W.VA. CODE3 38-7-2 (1985); R)IS STAT.ANN. 801.07 (West 1977
& Supp. 1988); WYO.STAT.8 1-15-201 (1988).
'11 There are opinions in these jurisdictions approving the use of attachment for the
purpose of obtaining security or to enforce a judgment, or to determine ownership of
property, but there is no indication of the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain
jurisdiction to adjudicate the type of disputes dealt with in this Article. See, eg., Huggins v. Deinhard, 134 Mi.98,102,654 P.2d 32,36 (1982) C6[t]hepresent case is distinguishable from Shnffer in that a California court, with in personam jurisdiction over
appellant, has entered a judgment. .'3; Levi S t r a w v. Crochet hiotor Sales, Inc, 293
Ark. 502, 507, 739 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1987) (Quasi in rem jurisdiction .sought not "as a
means by which to adjudicate a claim. . .it [the p l n i n m hod already obtained a judgment against [the defendant who] lived and worked in Arkansns!'); WiLlinmson v. Williamson, 247 Ga 260, 263, 275 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1981) ("[Ilf it can be shorm thnt the defendant has property in this state, there would be no diiculty in enforcing the Ariim
judgment against him here."); Rodrigues v. Rodrigues, 747 P.2d 1281 (Hnrr. App. 1987) 0
(quasi in rem jurisdiction for purpose of determining ownership between spouses sf
property located in the state); Black v. Black, 119 R L 127. 377 k 2 d 1308 (1977) (upholding the attachment of a non-resident's property to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction).

.
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Shaffer to quasi in rern jurisdiction show a newly found reluctance to make use of the doctrine. This indicates that Shaffer
has had a sobering impact on the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction
in these states. New Jersey is a good example. In McQueeny o.
J.W. Fergusson & Sons Inc.,'12 the federal district court for New
Jersey declared that, given Shaffer, "[tlhe status of the remedy
of attachment in New Jersey is in considerable doubt.""3 The
New Jersey statute at issue in McQueeny allowed quasi in rem
jurisdiction when a summons could not be served in the State of
New Jer~ey.""~To avoid constitutional problems, the court construed this statute to mean that pre-judgment attachment of
property would only be permitted when the defendant seeks to
"frustrate effective service by concealment or in absconding
from the state."l16
Delaware, the site of the Shaffer litigation, has exhibited a
similar hesitancy about quasi in rern jurisdiction. In Institute
Bancario Italiano v. Hunter,l16 the plaintiff commenced a stock
fraud case using quasi in rern jurisdiction against a Dutch corporation and a Dutch citizen. Jurisdiction was based upon prejudgment attachment of the stock.l17 In this case, unlike Shaffer, plaintiff argued, not without rea~on,"~
that quasi in rern jurisdiction was proper because the property attached was directly
related to the litigation."" The Delaware court, however, rejected the attempted use of quasi in rern jurisdiction.120A num527 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1981).
Id. at 730.
"' Id. a t 730-31 (citing N.J. REV.STAT.$ 2A:26-2 (1948)).
Id. a t 732.
449 A.2d 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982).
"'The plaintiff relied upon DEL.CODEANN.tit. 10, 5 365 (1974), the Delaware soquestration statute that was invoked by plaintiff in Shaffer.See note 65 and nccompanying text supra.
'IB Hunter, 449 A.2d a t 217. In Hunter, the property attached was the very subject
of the controversy since the question raised was whether the shares issued by the corporation were fraudulent. This is in contrast with Shafferwhere the stock attached had no
connection to the litigation. See notes 64, 79, 83 and accompanying text supra.
I l 8 Plaintiff also argued that the state had a strong interest in the litigation becauso
i t dealt with whether the stock issuances of a Delaware corporation were frnudulont or
not. The jurisdictional argument was buttressed by the observation that there was no
alternative forum, at least in the United States, that could hear the case. Ilunter, 449
A.2d at 216.
The court rejected the attempt to use quasi in rern jurisdiction notwithstanding
the fact that the stock was the subject matter of the lawsuit, that the Delaware Court of
Chancery would be best able to tailor an efficient and speedy remedy, that the cnse inn2
"3
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ber of other states have given strong indicat.ions that quasi in
rem jurisdiction after Shaffer is difficult to obtain, including
Alaska,12' Calif~rnia,'~~
C o n n e ~ t i c u t ,Kentucky,124
~~~
Massachuvolved international, and not merely interstate, parties and activity, and that D e I n ~ w e
had a vital interest in the prevention of abuse in the adminiitration of its corporate law.
Id. a t 222. The court relied on the fact that the property attached r;ns fictional in the
sense that it rras only by dint of state law that the "situs" of the stack ria p l o d in
Delaware even though the physical location of the stack r ~ o sekewhere. Id. a t 221. The
court's holding on the quasi in rem jurisdiction question rvas dicta bemuse the court
upheld in personam jurisdiction based on a "conspiracy" theory. Id. a t 225.
lZ1 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Bay Ridge, 509 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (D.
Alffih
1981) ("Shaffer invalidated the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction os m intrinsically ndequate basis of jurisdiction.").
lZ2 In California, the state courts before Shaffer gave a clear statement of support
for quasi in rem jurisdiction. A California court confronting a due process W e n g e to
the state's pre-judgment attachment law upheld the Inw on the grounds that:
The creditor's need to safeguard the collectibility of a judgment is substantially greater when the debtor is a nonresident than when he is a resident. for o
nonresident has contacts and roots outside the state which make it fnr more
likely he will be willing and able to transfer assets outside the state to defeat
his creditor's recovery than is true in the case of a resident debtor.
Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 CaL App. 3d 413,419, 100 cd
Rptr. 233,237 (1972). The cowtadhered to this view despite its recognition that "modem long arm statutes have substantially reduced the need for foreign attachment." Id.
Despite the strong support for jurisdictional pre-judgment attachment, hor;ever, there
are no reported post-Shaffer opinions in California in which quasi in rem jurisdiction has
been successfully obtained even though the California Inw continues to aulhorize prejudgment attachment based solely on the nonresidence of the defendant. Indeed, what
indications there are point to the conclusion that currently quasi in rem jurisdiction is
not favored in California
Nakasone v. Randall, 129 CaL App. 3d 757, 181 Cd. Rptr. 324 (1982), is the o d y
reported California opinion in which a party sought q u a i in rern jurisdiction of the seeond type. The attempt was unsuccessful. In Nakasone, the plnintiff sued an 86-yeu-old
nonresident for breach of contract for the sale of a parcel of r e d property l m t e d in
Mexico by attaching the defendant's property in Cnlifornia The court held that
"[nlonresident attachment is designed to operate where peraonal jurisdiction of a defendant cannot be obtained, but quasi in rern jurisdiction con be obtained b seizure of
the nonresident's property in the state." Id. a t 760, 181 CnL Rptr. nt 326. However, the
court vacated the writ of attachment because the 1977 amendments to the attachment
laws limiting attachment to situations in which the claim arose out of on indik5dunl's
"trade, business or profession," CAI. [CIV. PROC.]
CODE3 483.016 (\%St 19771, \ Y a not
satisfied. The only California cases that have granted quasi in rern jurkdiction d t u
Shaffer are limited to enforcement of judgments. Gingold v. Gingold, 161 C d App. 3d
1177,208 CaL Rptr. 123 (19%) (enforcement of c h i d support order). For o critical e ~ d u ation of the California attachment law, although not on this bsis, see Comment, Abuse
of Process and Attachment: Torcard a Balance of POICP~,
30 UCLA L
1218 [1933).
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48,459 k 4 d 503 (1933) (placing the
burden of proof on plaintiff to establish the minimum contacts necessary for q u a i in
rern jurisdiction, and remanding for a hearing).
lZ4 A recent decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, Citizens Bmk and Trust (20.
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~ e t t s , 'Oregon,12e
~~
Washington,12' and West Virginia.12B
Second, the remaining states cannot be counted as continuing to approve quasi in rern jurisdiction absent a reported opinion stating as much. Given the serious questions raised about
of Peducah v. Collins, 762 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1988), casts doubt on the realistic possibility
of quasi in rern jurisdiction in that state. In Citizens Bank, the plaintiff sued to recover
on a promissory note by attaching the nonresident defendant's property in the state. Tho
court interpreted Shaffer as standing for the proposition that when the "state could not
constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendants, the state was d s o
barred from exercising quasi in rern jurisdiction over them." Id, at 412. The dissenting
judge protested that the majority's decision was "premised on a fundamental misundorstanding of the nature of quasi in rern jurisdiction." Id. a t 413 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
In the dissent's opinion, Shaffer was limited to the use of property that is no moro than
a "tenuous legal fiction." Id. a t 414. In the instant case, the dissent argued that the real
property attached was not fictional, and that minimum contacts were established by tho
defendant's borrowing of money from a Kentucky bank and by the presence of the property in the state. The majority's failure to uphold jurisdiction on these facts, the dissent
Id.
claimed, "will unduly interfere with commercial transactions within this state
a t 414.
Iz6 Morrill v. Tong, 390 Mass. 120, 127-28, 453 N.E.2d 1221, 1226-27 (1983) (acknowledges that constitutional issues that have not been resolved by state courts are
posed by the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction after Shaffer).
Paulson Inv. Co., Inc. v. Norbay Securities, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D.Or.
1984). ("Although the quasi in rern doctrine has not been formally abrogated, tho moro
presence of stock in Oregon is not sufficient given the Supreme Court's opinion in Shal.
fer v. Heitner.").
Iz7 Even before Shaffer, Washington courts were skeptical about quasi in rern jurisdiction. In Ace Novelty Co. v. M.W. Kasch Co., 82 Wash. 2d 145, 508 P.2d 1366 (19731,
four years prior to Shaffer, the Washington Supreme Court observed that "conditions of
doing business in this country have changed remarkably" since the days of Pennoyer. Id.
a t 148,508 P.2d a t 1368. These changes, as well as a recognition of the "grave injustices"
possible when attachment is obtained, led the court to reject pre-judgment attachment
unless there is "jurisdiction over the proceeding against the principal defendant." Id. at
149,508 P.2d a t 1368. This cryptic holding led one commentator to wonder whether tho
court was "in fact rejecting a quasi in rern analysis as a basis for jurisdiction in tho
future!' Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Washington, 61 WASH.
L. Rev. 1,28 (1975). Professor Trautman concluded that the Ace Novelty opinion might
well mean that in Washington, "if a defendtint is not subject to in personam jurisdiction,
as through the long-arm statute, he may not be reached through a quasi in rern analysis." Id. a t 30. The absence of any reported opinions in Washington making use of quasi
in rern jurisdiction confirms Professor Trautman's observations.
In Gee v. Gibbs, 162 W. Va. 821, 253 S.E.2d 140 (1979), the West Virginia Supreme Court expressed serious doubts about the constitutionality of quasi in rom jurisdiction in light of Shaffer and amendments to the state's long-arm statute extending in
personam jurisdiction to the limits of due process. The court, in remanding the cnso to
the trial court for consideration of the constitutional question, suggested that attachment jurisdiction might well be unconstitutional. Id. a t n.3, 253 S.E.2d 140 a t n.3 (citing
with approval Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV.355 (1973) (arguing that pre-judgment attachment is unconstitutional whenever personal jurisdiction can be obtained)).

. . . ."
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quasi in rem jurisdiction, it is reasonable to expect that if it rras
used in a particular jurisdiction, there would be, in the thirteen
years since Shaffer, at least one reported opinion examining or
commenting on its use, or at least acknowledging its existence.
However, there is not the slightest suggestion in the reported
opinions of these states that the concept has any remaining life.
If, then, these states do not actually use quasi in rem jurisdiction, what accounts for this rather dramatic fall from popularity? Tho explanations come to mind. First, in the decade
since Shaffer there has been a steady expansion of long arm jurisdi~ti0n.l~~
This expansion significantly lessens the need for
IZ* In some states in the post-Shaffer decade, courts have issued broad interpretntions of the state long arm statute. See, e.g., Helitzer v. Helitzer, 761 F.2d 582 (1Qth Cir.
1985); Poyner v. Erma Werke GhfBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 US.
841 (1980); Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977); RI. Hosp. Trust Nnt'l
Bank v. San Gabriel Hydroelectric Partnership, 667 F. Supp. 66 @.RL 1981); Beh V.
Ostergard, 657 F. Supp. 173 @.N.hl. 1987); Horizons Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp.
~
hfonetary
771 0.S.D. 1982); Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. IV. V V 1981);
Corp. v. Chesney, 514 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. hlich. 1960); Hiii Corner I n c v. Intlight Cinema Intern. Inc., 505 F. Supp. 12 (h5.D. Tenn. 1980); Standnrd Tollow Corp. v. Jowdy,
190 Conn. 48,459 k 2 d 503 (1983); Tyson v. Whitaker 6: Son Inc, 407 k 2 d 1(hfe. 1979);
Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132,395 k 2 d 464 (1978); State v. Continental Forms Inc, 356
N.iV.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Binnchi, 530 k 2 d 569 Wt.
1987).
In addition, a number of state long arm statutes have been interpreted hs extending
to the limits of due process. See, e.g., ALA. R CIV. P. 4.2; ALASKASTAT.
$ 09.05.615 (1983);
ARE. REV.STAT.ANN. $ 10-106 (amended 1984); ARK. STAT.
ANN.$ 16-4-101 (1975); GAL
[CIV]. CODE 410.10 (West 1970); COLO.REV. STAT.
$ 13-1-124 (1963); CONN. GEN.STAT.
ANN. 5 52-57a (West 1985); IND.CODEANN, TRIAL
R 4.4; KAN.CN. PROC
CODEANN. 3
60-308 (Vernon 1986); KY. REV.STAT.ANN. 3 454.210 (hlichie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988);
ME REV. STAT.
ANN, tit. 14,s 704a (1964 & Supp. 1988); hiD. [CTS6: JUD.
PROG.]
CODE
ANN. 6103 (1957 & Supp. 1988); hficn Coaw. LAIS'S
ANN. $ 600.705 (\Vat 1975); hfihx
STAT.ANN. 5 .543.19 ( k t 1982); NEB. REV. STAT.$ 25-536(2) (1967); N.H. REV.STAT.
ANN. 510.4 (1969); N.hL STAT.ANN. $ 38-1-16 (1989); OHIOREV. CODEANN.3 2307.38.2
(Anderson 1965); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 12, 3 2004 (\Vest 1984); PA.STAT.
ANN.tit. 42, 3
5308 (Purdon 1978); ILL GEN.LAWS$9-5-33 (reenacted 1985); S.C. CODEANN.$ 36-2-803
(Law. Co-op. 1962); SD. CODIFIEDLAIS'S
ANN. 3 15-7-2 (1965); TENti. CODEANN. 3 20-2214 (Supp. 1988); TEX REV. Cnr STAT.ANN.art. 2031b (Vernon 1959); UTAHCODEANN. $
78-27-22 (1969); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, $ 855 (1947); Ivan REV. CODE5 4.28.18 (1959);
IV- VA. CODE$ 56-3-33 (Supp. 1988); FYrS STAT.ANN. $ 801.05 (\Vest 1976); IVso. STAT.
§
5-1-107 (1967, amended 1977). In all of these states there are court decisions thnt have
interpreted the long arm statute to extend to the full limits of the due p r o w s dnuse.
However, these decisions are subject to a caveat. It is possible that the courts do not
mean that the statute covers all the situations in which jurisdiction under International
Shoe would be possible, only that for the topics covered, the statute exerts tho full power
permitted under the Constitution. See generally R CMAD, supra note 41, a t 4-4. In any
event, it is clear that in these states the long arm statute "should be construed v e q
liberally." Id. a t 4-5.
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quasi in rern jurisdiction, which was developed in large part because of limitations on state courts' ability to obtain jurisdiction
over nonresidents.lgOThe expansion also suggests that many
states have opted to respond to Shaffer by amending long arm
acts, rather than searching for a new rationale to support quasi
in rern jurisdiction.
Second, in a number of states there has been litigation challenging the state's attachment laws on procedural due process
grounds.lg1As a result of these attacks, the requirements for obtaining pre-judgment attachment have stiffened significantly.lga
The increased difficulty of obtaining an order of attachment in
these jurisdictions may have dampened the enthusiasm of counsel and courts for quasi in rern jurisdiction.
The absence of any reported opinions, the expansion of long
arm jurisdiction, and the tightening of procedural requirements
for pre-judgment attachment support the conclusion that, at
present, quasi in rern jurisdiction has no meaningful role to play
in many states. However, this conclusion must be tempered by
the recognition that a new approach to quasi in rern jurisdiction
is emerging. This new approach might begin to influence those
states that have not used quasi in rern jurisdiction since Shaffer,
1

See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Maudlin, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988); Watertown
Equipment Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987);
Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1985); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. Inc.,
639 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1981); Sugar v. Curtis Circulation, 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (three judge court), remanded, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); Stoller Fisheries Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1977); Hillhouse v. Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369,
559 P.2d 1148 (1977); Penrod Drilling Co. v. Bounds, 433 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1983); Williams v. Matovich, 172 Mont. 109, 560 P.2d 1338 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of Santa Fo v.
Southwest Yacht & Marine Supply Corp., 101 N.M. 431,684 P.2d 517 (1984); Peobles v.
Clement, 63 Ohio St. 2d 314,408 N.E.2d 689 (1980); Guy H. James Const. Co, v. Department of Transp., 655 P.2d 553 (Okla. 1982); Rocky B. Fisheries Inc. v. North Bond
Fabrication & Mach. Inc., 66 Or. App. 625, 676 P.2d 319 (1984); Yanero v. Fox, 163 W.
Va. 222, 256 S.E.2d 751 (1979).
IS'
For a description of the tightening of the procedural requirements that havo
taken place in one state as a result of this kind of litigation, see note 200 infra.
Other changes to the attachment laws evidence a t least an implicit legislative rejection of the concept of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Illinois, for example, rovised its law to
provide a specific section authorizing the courts of that state to make use of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. ILL. ANN.STAT.ch. 110, ll 12-611 (Smith-Hurd 1982). However, the statuto is
limited to enforcement of judgments. This limited statute gives rise to a reasonable prosumption that the legislature did not intend for its courts to continue to make uso of
quasi in rern jurisdiction of the second type. The absence of a single reported caso in
which the plaintiff sought this type of pre-judgment attachment buttresses this opinion.
13'

I3l
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but have not yet rejected it either. Thus, it is premature to proclaim the death of quasi in rem jurisdiction in America. We turn
now to examine the development of the new quasi in rem
jurisdiction.

C. The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
In contrast to the trend away from the use of quasi in rem
jurisdiction in many parts of the country, in some states, most
notably New York, the doctrine has been revived despite Shaffer.ls3 This dramatic development has taken place, for the most
part, without legislative authorization. This section describes the
new doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction and considers its
causes.

1. The Development and Rationale for the New Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction in New York
The most influential case in the development of the new
doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction is the New York Court of
Appeals' 1984 decision in Banco Ambrosiano u. Artoc Bank and
Trust Co.ls4 In that case Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian bank,
sued to recover a fifteen million dollar loan to Artoc, a Bahamian bank. The loan was negotiated in Italy, the Bahamas and
Peru; the proceeds were to be used in South America. The sole
New York connection with the transaction was that the loan was
to be made in United States dollars to a New York account that
Artoc maintained, and was to be repaid to another New York
account established by Banco Ambrosiano. The reason for this
was "that the transaction was to be in United States dollars and
therefore had to be handled through such clearing accounts."130
l"
This development has been little noticed by commentators. Indeed, they predicted early in the game that Shnffer would virtually eliminate qunsi in rem jurisdiction
in New York. A leading commentator on New York practice voiced this sentiment by
declariig that the Shaffer holding had "drastically restricted" the use of qunsi in rem
ON NEWYORKPRACTICE
:6 104, nt 122
jurisdiction in the state. D. SEGEL,HANDBOOK
(1978). Another claimed that Shnffer had abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction. Fanell,
supra note 14, at 449 ("In June, 1977, the Court decided unanimously in S M e r v. Heitner that the states may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction."). Nevertheless, the cases
prove otherwise; quasi in rem jurisdiction is alive and well in New York See note3 13470 and accompanying text infra.
lS4 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
lSs Id. at 69-70,464 N.E.2d at 434,476 N.Y.S.2d a t 66.
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Banco Ambrosiano attached Artoc's bank account, its "sole contact" with New York State.13$In the ensuing jurisdictional challenge, Banco Ambrosiano conceded that the New York long arm
statute did not provide grounds for the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction over Artoc.13' However, Banco Ambrosiano argued
that the attachment of Artoc's New York bank account was sufficient to provide quasi in rern jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals unanimously upheld jurisdiction.
Chief Judge Wachtler, writing for the court, began by noting
that "at first blush, the usefulness of quasi in rern jurisdiction
has been eliminated by Shaffer."13$This was so because the New
York state legislature had authorized quasi in rern jurisdiction
when its conceptual foundation derived solely from the presence
of property within the state.lgOWith Shaffer and International
Shoe, however, the common law structure that had supported
the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction fell.140 Thereafter, a state, if
it wished, could obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full
extent permitted by due process even if the nonresidents had no
physical presence or property in the state.
Nevertheless, the Banco Ambrosiano court held that the
limited reach of New York's long arm statute provided a rationale for the continued use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The court
found it "important" that "CPLR 302 [New York's long arm
statute] does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible."141
Without further elaboration, the Court deemed the statutory
constraints of the long arm statute created a "gap" that quasi in
rern jurisdiction could fill. The court reasoned as follows:
CPLR 302 does not provide for in personam jurisdiction in every case
in which due process would permit it. Thus, a "gap" exists in which
the necessary minimum contacts, including the presence of defendant's property within the State, are present, but personal jurisdiction
is not authorized by CPLR 302. It is appropriate, in such case, to fill
that gap utilizing quasi in rem principle^."^

Id. at 70, 464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
Id.
ISS Id.
IS8 The court pointed to CPLR 301 which, when it took effect in 1963, fourtoon
years prior to Shaffer, was intended to preserve "all previously existing jurisdictional
bases." Id. at 71, 464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
I4O Id. at 70-71, 464 N.E.2d at 434-35, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
14' Id. at 71, 464 N.E.2d at 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
Id. at 71-72, 464 N.E.2d at 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 67. The court relied upon an
IS6

IS'
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The court interpreted Shaffer in a way that did not constitutionally prohibit the court from using quasi in rem jurisdiction
to fill the gap in New York's long arm statute. Chief Judge
Wachtler stated that Shaffer stood for the proposition that
quasi in rem jurisdiction was unconstitutional only when the
"property has no relationship to the cause of action, and there
are no other ties among the defendant, the forum and the litigati~n."'"~The court held that Artoc's bank account was "closely
related to plaintSs claim," because it was into this account that
the proceeds of the loan were to be paid,lJ4Artoc regularly used
the account for other transactions, and Artoc had agreed to repay the loan to Banco Ambrosiano's New York
Therefore, the court held quasi in rem jurisdiction was constitutional in the Banco Ambrosiano case.
Even before Banco Ambrosiano, New York courts140had
made free use of quasi in rem jurisdiction, without much discussion of its theoretical basis beyond an attempt to demonstrate
that it was constitutional under Shaffer.lJ7Since Banco AmbroAlbany Law Review Note for its authority for this proposition. Note, hfinimum Contacts
and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, a t 306.
In developing its rationale for this post-Shaffer use of qunsi in rem jurisdiction, the
Banco court did not deal with the argument that absent substantial justitlation, prejudgment attachment may violate defendant's right to full use of property ptior to judgment, or that quasi in rem jurisdiction is inconsistent with res judicatn principle% For n
discussion of the significance of these factors, see notes 198-231 nnd nccompmying text
infra.
Banco Ambrosiano, 62 N.Y.2d a t 71,464 N.E.2d a t 435,476 N.Y.S.2d nt 67.
14' Id. a t 72, 464 N.E.2d a t 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t 67.
Id. a t 73,464 N.E.2d at 436,476 N.Y.S.2d a t 68.
The term "New York courts" encompasses federal as well as stnto courts since, as
will be shown, the federal courts, exercising diversity jurisdiction, hnve mnde liberal we
of quasi in rem jurisdiction in New York. Interestingly, however, the federal courts hnve
not contributed to the articulation of the rationale for the new qunsi in rern jurisdiction.
While there are many reported federal cases making use of qunsi in rem jurisdiction
under New York state law, see notes 154-57 and accompanying text suprs, none nddress
this question at all. They proceed rather on the assumption that quasi in rem jurisdiction is authorized in the state so long as in the circumstances of the cnse i t am be constitutionally invoked.
Two pre-Banco cases stand out. The first, Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F.
Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a federal district court opinion, is the more dmmntic. In
Feder, plaintiff brought a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane crash neiu
Istanbul, Turkey. The defendant airline compaay did not have an office or m y employees in New York, nor did it solicit business in the state. The only connection between the
defendant and New York was a $100,000 New York bank account. This wns the property
which plaintiff attached. It was unclear whether the account was relnted to the plaintifs'
cause of action. The court stated that "the circumstances surrounding the opening and
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siano, a host of New York cases have upheld the use of quasi in
From these additional cases, one gains a
rern jurisdi~tion.'~~
fuller appreciation of the new theory of quasi in rern jurisdict i ~ n . 'The
~ ~ new quasi in rern jurisdiction is used primarily to

operation of THY'S bank account here are not revealed!' Id. at 1278. Howovor, tho court
did not delve further since it held that this fact was unnecessary to its decision. See id.
a t 1277.
The court upheld the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction notwithstanding tho absence of any other contacts between the defendant, the forum and the cause of action.
The court chose to view the voluntary act of opening a bank account as supplying minimum contacts necessary to sustain jurisdiction. The court rejected the defendant's argument that Shaffer prohibited jurisdiction premised on the mere presence, without moro,
of unrelated property in the state. The court instead focused on Justice Stevens's concurring opinion for the proposition that Shaffer was limited to intangible proporty
brought into the state unintentionally. Thus, Shaffer did not prohibit attachment of tan.
gible property like a bank account which is purposefully opened in the state. Id. a t 127879.
So certain was the court of the correctness of its holding that it refused to certify tho
defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal. In doing so, the court recorded its boliof
that there is no substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the proposition that
a bank account." Id. a t 1280. Justice
Shaffer "does not apply to an attachment o f .
Marshall might have been surprised.
The second major federal case in the development of quasi in rern jurisdiction in
New York is the Second Circuit's opinion in Intermeat v. American Poultry, 576 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1978). The plaintiff seller sued an Ohio corporation for breach of contract
regarding the shipment of poultry to New York. Quasi in rern jurisdiction was sought
based upon the attachment of a debt owed to defendant by the A&P grocory chain,
another New York corporation. Id. a t 1018.
Although the debt was unrelated to plaintiffs cause of action, the court sustainod
the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The court read Shaffer to mean that:
[Plroceedings begun by attachment now means that the presence of defendant's property within New York must be viewed as only one contact of tho
defendant with the state, to be considered along with other contacts in deciding whether the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice!'
Id. a t 1022 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)),
Since the defendant did a substantial amount of business in New York, and sinco tho
contract was negotiated with a New York plaintiff, the court found that minimum contacts were present in the case, although it acknowledged that the contacts wero insufficient to satisfy New York's statutory requirements for the assertion of in porsonam jurisdiction. Id. a t 1018-19.
The federal courts in both Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.
1978), and Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), recognized that
the theoretical underpinnings for quasi in rern jurisdiction as expressed in Pennoyer
were abrogated by Shaffer. Although the doctrinal bases for quasi in rern jurisdiction
were shaken, these courts proceeded to exercise jurisdiction by simply grafting tho Shaffer decision upon the New York attachment statutes, presuming that the exorcise of
quasi in rern jurisdiction was still authorized.
Id8 See notes 149-68 and accompanying text infra.
lde See notes 150-70 infra.

..
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provide a New York forum for a plaintiff who otherwise would
not be able to sue in New York because the defendant's relationship to the state does not fall within the long arm statute.160
New York courts have made deep inroads into the limitations
otherwise imposed by the long arm statute on the state's assertion of adjudicative power over nonresidents. Several cases illustrate this trend.
In Majique Fashions v. W a r w i ~ k for
, ~ ~example,
~
a Korean
corporation's New York bank account was attached to adjudicate a claim arising out of the corporation's alleged tortious failure to perform a contractual obligation in Hong Kong. The defendant had no offices or employees in New York, was not
licensed to do business there, and owned no real estate or other
property in the state, other than the single bank account which
the plaintiff attached. On these facts, the plaintiffs chose to
"forego any attempt at personal jurisdiction under the 'long
arm' statute."162 The New York court, nevertheless, upheld
quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment of the defendant's
bank account.16s
See notes 151-56 and accompanying text infra.
67 A.D.2d 321, 414 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1979).
ln2 Id. a t 325, 414 N.Y.S.2d a t 919. Thii apparently rvns a correct decision. On the
L.& R. 302(a)(l) (hlcKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989) [hereinnffacts alleged, N.Y. CN. PRAC.
ter CPLR], was not satisfied since the defendant had not physically negotiated or performed the contract in New York, which are two factors important in establishing the
defendant's purposeful activities in New York, a necessary condition for jurisdiction
under that provision. Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equip. Gorp., 555 F.
Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); J.E.T. Advertising Associates, I n c v. Lnvm King, Inc, 84
kD.2d 744,443 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1981); O'Connor, Long Arm Jurisdiction in Nela
York Contract Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1982, a t 1, coL 2. The provision of CPLR 5
302(a)(3) that permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tort outside the
state having consequences in the state might have been more promising. T h t prevision.
however, requires that defendant either regularly solicit business in New York, or derive
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, CPLR 302(4(3)(iI and
(ii). It is conceivable that the plaintiff might have been able to sntisfy the latter condition, but since he failed to allege facts about it the more reasonnble assumption is that
he could not.
lSS The court found that minimum contacts were present in this situation since it
noted that on these facts the defendant "expected or should reasombly expect its oct[s]
to have consequences in New York." Majique, 67 A.D.2d a t 325,414 N.Y.S.2d a t 919. In
discussing this case, Professor Siegel points out that using a foreseenbility element to
determine the constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction is risky. Hi reservntion is
based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Jlrorld-Wide Volkswngen Gorp. v. W&n,
444 U.S. 286 (1980). decided after hiajique, which seems to d i m i s foreseeability as n
major factor in long arm jurisdiction. But Professor Siegel distinguishes hiajique from
150

l"
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Drexel Burnham Lambert v. D'AngelolS4is "another illustration of where activities i n s a c i e n t to support personal jurisdiction (under the long arm statute) may nonetheless satisfy the
apparently less demanding quasi in rem jurisdiction."lDDThe
plaintiff claimed that its own acts in New York concerning security transfers were imputable to the defendant. Although at
the time New York courts had refused to interpret the long arm
statute in,this way,lS8the court permitted quasi in rem jurisdiction based upon the attachment of defendant's New York
The new quasi in rem jurisdiction is most commonly used in
situations such as Drexel Burnham and Banco Ambrosiano, in
which the defendant has engaged in business deals with New
Yorkers without performing activities that fit within the fairly
rigid limitations applicable to the "transacting business" provision of the long arm statute.lS8However, not all the cases are so
limited. Some courts have allowed the new quasi in rem jurisdiction to be applied in situations that come squarely within the
long arm statute.lSSFor these courts, quasi in rem jurisdiction is
almost second nature, to be used whenever a New Yorker wants
to sue a nonresident who has property here.leO While these
World- Wide Volkswagen, since Majique involved intentional conduct in a contract cnso
while World- Wide Volkswagen was a tort action for personal injuries. D. SIEOEL,supra
note 133, a t 3 104. Professor Siegel's distinction between tort and contract cases seems
borne out by subsequent Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. V.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzev~icz,471 U.S. 462
(1985).
I M 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
loo D. SIEGEL,
supra note 133, a t 4 104 (1987 Supp.).
IoB In actions by an agent against his foreign principal, New York courts havo rofused to attribute the acts of the agent to the principal for jurisdictional purposes under
CPLR 302. The courts have required the defendant to engage in independent activity
towards New York and actions of the agent cannot be deemed the defendant's indepondent activities. Drexel, 453 F. Supp. a t 1297. Recent developments indicate that this
view may be changing. See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460,522 N.E,2d
40, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1988).
lo'
Drexel, 453 F. Supp. at 1298.
Io8 See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978);
Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Ahrnad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 26, 1980).
loD See, e.g., Unitech USA, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 91 A.D.2d 903, 457 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st
Dep't 1983).
IB0 As one court put it: "[slince the nonresident defendant in most cases will not bo
subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York, attachment is necessary
ACLI
Int'l Commodity Sews., Inc. v. Grey, No. 80-7227, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1981).

. . . ."
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courts have sometimes recognized that there is an inherent
"harshness" that flows from the forceful attachment of an individual's property prior to a determination of liability, this has
apparently not been a deterrent.lel
Despite a clear receptivity to quasi in rern jurisdiction by
New York courts, and some attempt at developing a theory for
it, New York courts have failed to articulate clearly the parameters of the doctrine. For example, as some New York courts have
interpreted the new quasi in rern jurisdiction, there must be a
direct relationship between the property attached and the
claim.le2 However, other courts have not required this connection.le3The latter group have split on whether or not other contacts with the jurisdiction are required; some hold that it is not
neces~ary)1~~
while others appear to say that it is
Some opinions stress the lack of any other forum for the plaintifF as a key determinant;le6 others do not.le7 Those courts that
Is'
Standard Steel and Tinplate Corp. v. hianuel Int'l D.LS.C., Inc, No. 81-5118,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1981).
Ie2 See, eg., F
it Palm Beach Int'l Bank v. Banco De Descuento, S.A., No. 85-3656
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); Republic Nat'l Bnnk of New
York v. Ahmad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,1980) (funds in attached bank account directly related to cause of action); Bnnm Ambrosiano v. Artcsc
Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (cause of action
directly related to bank account attached); Unitech USA, I n c v. Ponsoldt, 91 A.D.2d
903,457 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1983) (funds in escrow account that were attached wcre
directly related to plaintws cause of action).
leS See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1918)
(attached bank account unrelated to plaintiffs claim); Excel Shipping Gorp. v. Seatrain
Int'l, 584 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (voluntary act of
opening unrelated bank account sufficient in itself to supply basis for quasi in rern
jurisdiction).
lB5
Intermeat, Inc v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978) (la& of
connection between cause of action and attached property does not preclude q u a i in
rern jurisdiction so long as there are other contacts between the defendant m d the forum
state); Excel Shipping Corp. v. Seatrain Int'l, 584 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
lee Shaffer left open the possibility that in quasi in rem jurisdiction cnses the exercise of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property might be constitutional if
there is no other forum that could hear the suit available. Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 211 n.37.
This theme has been suggested in some New York quasi in rern cases, see A m m Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 I2d
Cir. 1979); Excel Shipping Corp., 584 F. Supp. a t 741; Republic National Bnnk of New
York v. Ahmad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,1980) (v~herothere is
no alternative forum lesser standard of minimum contacts may be applied); J.S. Service
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do emphasize the lack of an alternate forum are not clear about
whether the unavailable forum concept means the lack of another United States forum or the lack of any forum.108Moreover, we still do not know whether the new quasi in rern jurisdiction is subject to a lower-level minimum contacts analysis.loO
Nor have we yet been told whether the doctrine only affects tangible property intentionally brought into the state, or whether it
can be invoked on the basis of intangible property, which is fortuitously within the jurisdi~tion.'~~
Thus, the contours of the
new quasi in rern jurisdiction are not apparent.
,2. The Justification for the New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction

in New York
Despite its vagueness, there can be little doubt that the new
judge-created quasi in rern jurisdiction gives New York courts
greater power to regulate the reach of New York's extraterritorial jurisdiction than that which is provided under the state's
long arm statute.17' Since the new quasi in rern jurisdiction is
Center Corp. v. Banco Continental, 103 Misc. 2d 325,425 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1980) (no alternative forum is a factor in quasi in rern jurisdiction
analysis).
le7 See, e.g., Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d
432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (lack of alternative forum not explicitly considered).
lee See, e.g., J.S. Service Center Corp., 103 Misc. 2d a t 328, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 947
("The troublesome issue . . .is whether the Supreme Court [in Shaffer] meant no other
forum in the United States or no other forum a t all.").
lee Several scholars identified this as a major post-Shaffer question. See, e.g., Silbcrman, supra note 3, a t 68, 71-73; Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at 1198. However, the New
York cases do not explicitly address this question.
Although New York courts have not articulated a lesser constitutional standard for
quasi in rern jurisdiction as compared to in personam jurisdiction, they have certainly
permitted quasi in rern jurisdiction in situations where in personam is not available
under the long arm statute.
170 The case law on this topic is a t best confused. Compare Feder v. Turkish AItlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quasi in rern jurisdiction upheld because property was tangible bank account with funds intentionally brought into the state) with
Fine v. Spierer, 109 A.D.2d 611, 486 N . Y . s .9~(1st
~ Dep't 1985) (quasi in rern jurisdiction upheld when property attached was the nonresident defendant's unrealized interest
in his mother's estate).
171 In 1979 Professor Silberman saw three areas left open by Shaffcr for a state to
use quasi in rern jurisdiction should it choose to do so: (1) where the facts standing alone
are insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction; (2) where the property attached is
traditional property such as real estate or bank accounts; and (3) where there is no other
available forum. Silberman, supra note 3, a t 71-77. New York's vigorous use of the doctrine overlaps with each of these categories.
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New York is not totally alone in its use of the new quasi in
rem jurisdiction. The next section considers the growing number
of states that continue to use quasi in rem jurisdiction after
Shaffer, and suggests that the New York approach provides a
potential allure to that "silent majority" of states that have
neither rejected quasi in rem jurisdiction nor currently use it.
3. Other States that Use Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction After
Shaffer

In addition to New York, a number of other states use quasi
in rem jurisdiction to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents even
after Shaffer. This use, although limited, might be an indication
that the New York approach is beginning to have national influence. Mississippi comes closest to following the path laid by
New York. In Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund
v. C o ~ l e y , 'for
~ ~ example, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a
sweeping opinion, upheld quasi in rem jurisdiction. Cooley involved a medical malpractice claim that arose in Louisiana. Jurisdiction rested solely on the presence of the attached property
in the state, much of it unrelated to the plaintiffs' underlying
claim.17'j The property attached was the medical debt owed by
plaintiff to the defendant, and the gate receipts due the defendant from a football game played in Mississippi by the defendant's team.lT7
421, [I9841 N.Y. Laws 377 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (effective July 19,1984). The purposo
of this law was "enhancing New York's position as a major financial and commorcial
center by enabling it to develop a sophisticated system of commercial jurisprudenco." J.
WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN& A. MILLER,NEWYORKPRACTICE
$ 327.04 (Supp. 1988). The bill's
sponsors urged its passage to preserve " 'the standing of New York as a cornmorcial and
financial center."' Id. (quoting Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of Legislation
(A.7303-A) (1984) a t 2).
Administrators of The Tulane Educ. Fund v. Cooley, 462 So. 2d 696 (Miss. 1984).
17%Id. a t 698.
17~
The court held that the presence of this property, plus the defendant's substan.
tial activities in the state were enough to subject it to jurisdiction over unrelated claims,
The court's opinion was grounded in its awareness that the defendant, Tulane Univorsity, was located "[als the crow flies, . . . less than a hundred miles from parts of
Mississippi . . . . Although the nerve center of Tulane's educational and service programs is in Louisiana, the university has a variety of contacts with Mississippi and engages in a plethora of activities in and related to Mississippi." Id. at 699. This judgment
was aided by the personal experience of the author who noted that on a day off from
judicial duties he "personally witnessed the Tulane football team doing substantial 'business' in Oxford Mississippi as it defeated Ole Miss 26-24 in a miserable, drizzling rain."

...
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Other Mississippi cases reveal that Cooley is not atypical.
Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft C O . , for
~ ~example,
~
allowed
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim arising out
of a plane crash in Mississippi even though the property attached was completely unrelated to plaintifPs claim?7e Because
the state's long arm statute did not apply, plaintiff would have
been unable to sue in the state without attachment jurisdiction.lS0 Thus, the court used quasi in rem jurisdiction to fill a
gap in the state's long arm statute.lsl
Id. a t 699 n.2.
With these substantial activities, the court had little diiculty in concluding thnt the
m i n i m contacts standard of International Shoe and Shaffer rins satisfied. Id. n t 70105.
603 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. hliss. 1985).
17B Plaintiff attached debts owed Cessna by hliissippi ahcraft denlers and flight
schools for the sale or use of their products in the state. Id. a t 288.
Is0 Mississippi's long-arm statute may only be invoked by plnintiffs tyho are residents of the state. hfxss CODEANN. § 13-3-57 (1972). In Estate of Portnoy, the plnintS's
husband was a resident of Pennsylvania who died while on a training mission to hwsippi as a member of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. See Estate of Porttzoy, 603
F. Supp. a t 288. Accordingly, the state's long-arm statute was not availnble to.plaintiffin
that case. The court did not consider the constitutional issue posed by o long arm statute
that provides benefits to residents over nonresidents. See Bendii Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enterprises, Inc,486 U.S. 888 (1988) (holdiig unconstitutionnl n state statute
of limitations law that discriminated against nonresidents).
lal The Portmy court cited one New York quasi in rem jurisdiction case, Intermeat,
Inc v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), thnt pioneered the use of this
theory. See note 146 and accompanying text supra.
L i e New York, the Mississippi use of quasi in rem jurisdiction m y not be limited
to filling gaps in the long-arm statutes. In Universal Computer Sen%., I n c v. Lyd, 464
So. 2d 69 ( M i . 1985), the hliissippi Supreme Court upheld the seizure of an nutornobide as a means of adjudicating a suit for back wages in circumstances where in pemnnm
jurisdiction seemed clearly available. In Lyall, the plaintiffI who was a resident of Mississippi, sued his employer, a foreign corporation, for back pay. The plnintiffa wages viere
allegedly earned in h f k i i i p p i so presumably suit could hnve been brought under the
l o n g - m statute which provides in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents who are sued
for breach of "a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in wbole.or in part
in this state." Mrss. CODEANN. 3 13-3-57 (1972).
Subsequent cases, however, cloud this picture. In Anderson v. S o ~ Explorntion
t
Corp., 523 So. 2d 1024 ( M i . 1988), the state supreme court indicated thnt nttachment
may not be authorized when in personam jurisdiction can also be obtained. This shift in
attitude may have been influenced by changes to the state's attachment Inv~rihich r;ns
declared unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds in two opinions. hlPI I n c
v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. h l i . 1978); hiissiippi Chem. Corp. v. C h e m i d
Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. h l i . 1977). There are strong indications in the
MPI holding that attachment for jurisdictional purposes without n showing of n e d t y
would violate due process. See hfPI, 463 F. Supp. a t 695.
When the law was amended in 1982 in response to these opinions, a requirement W ~ L I
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Utah also makes use of quasi in rern jurisdiction, although
in a much different and more limited way. Rhoades v. Wrightle2
was a wrongful death action filed by the family of a Utah farmer
from the Utah-Colorado border area. The farmer had been murdered by a Colorado neighbor, on the Colorado side of the border. The Utah Supreme Court permitted quasi in rern jurisdiction to be used after nine years of litigation and several
unsuccessful attempts to obtain in personam jurisdiction.lS3The
court justified quasi in rern jurisdiction based on the defendant's
ownership and use of "decidedly tangible and immovable" property in Utah, the fact that "the prime issue" in the case was the
defendant's continued right to use the property, and, most importantly, the fact that there was no other forum available to
the plaintiff.lS4The court stressed the lack of any other forum
and the fact that quasi in rern jurisdiction was a "last resort" for
the plaintiff.lS5
added that the person seeking attachment specify in a pre-attachment affidavit why "tho
complainants [sic] ability to recover the amount of his claim may be endangered or imCODEANN.3 11-31-2(l)(a) (1982).
peded if the order of attachment is not issued." MISS.
If in personam jurisdiction is available, and if security attachment is not sought, but
rather pure quasi in rern jurisdiction of the second type, it is difficult to see how this
requirement can be met.
lsz Rhoades v. Wright, 552 P.2d 131 (Utah 1976) (Rhoades I); Rhoades v. Wright,
622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (Rhoades In. See note 183
and accompanying text infra.
IB3
The first case, a diversity action under the Utah long arm statute, was dismissed
by the Tenth Circuit. The grounds for this decision are not given; the dismissal is contained in an unpublished per curium opinion. See 622 P.2d at 344 n.2. However, it can
be surmised that in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm statute was not available
since the killing took place in Colorado, and the wrong did not arise out of the defendant's ownership of property in the state. See generally UTAHCODEANN.3 78-27-24 to -28
(1953).
The plaintiff then filed state actions simultaneously in Utah and Colorado. The Colorado action was dismissed on the ground that the state's statute of limitations had run,
622 P.2d a t 344. In this procedural posture, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the uso of
quasi in rern jurisdiction as the only means of providing the plaintiff with a forum for
her claim. In the first opinion decided a year prior to Shaffer, the court upheld the use of
attachment jurisdiction on Pennoyer grounds. Rhoades I, 552 P.2d a t 133-35. After
Shaffer, the defendant moved for reconsideration, which triggered the court's second
opinion. See 662 P.2d a t 344-45.
Id. at 346-47.
Ia5 Id. at 347. As the court explained:
We are mindful that plaintiff has attempted to litigate her claim both in
the United States District Court for Utah and the Colorado District Court.
However, in neither instance was plaintiff permitted to reach the morits of hor
claim. I t cannot be denied that so far as this case is concerned, plaintiff has no
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In addition to Mississippi and Utah,seven other states appear milling to use quasi in rem jurisdiction. F l ~ r i d a , 'Louisi~~
ana,fa7North C a r ~ l i n a , 'and
~ ~ New Hampshirelse all have inother available forum.
Id.

FTASTAT.
ANN.3 77.01 West 1967). In Wiggins v. Dojcsan, 411 So. 2d 894 (Fln.
Ct. App. 19821, a Florida intermediate appellate court, over strong dissent, upheld
the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate a clnim on a promissory note against a
lB6

%ti.

nonresident defendant. The court permitted the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff to attach the property. Although the court recognized
that pre-judgment attachment has long been considered an indispensable attribute of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, it dispensed with the requirement because i t was fraught with
procedural due process problems. Id. a t 895-96.
The dissenting judge disagreed that attachment could be so ensily dispensed with.
Moreover, the dissent read Shuffer as rendering "jurisdictional attachment Inrgely o b s
lete in states such as Florida which have comprehensive long-arm statutes thnt encompass most types of minimum contacts." Id. a t 896 (Grimes, J., dissenting). The dissent
objected to the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in this case when in personnm jurisdiction under the long arm statute was possible. T o permit quasi in rem jurisdiction the
dissent wrote: "puts [the defendants] in a better position than they would hnve been if
they had obtained personal jurisdiction." Id. a t 897.
LA CODECIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 4850 (West 1966). In John v. Bmhmn Petroleum
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. L a 1988), a federal district court upheld the use of qumi
in rem jurisdiction against a nonresident whose only contact with the state was the precrence of the attached property. The defendant challenged the nttnchment on both promdural and substantive due process grounds. The court rejected both contentions. First, i t
found that the procedural attack was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 1915 opinion in
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which i t held was "untnmished" by Fuentcu v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). John, 699 F. Supp. a t 1221. This conclusion is subject to
serious question. For a discussion of Ownbey, and why i t may not stand for the propmition for which it was cited, see note 206 infra. Second, the John court held thnt the
relnted
defendant's reliance on Shuffer was misplaced because the property nttached
to the claim. This far reaching opinion may presage the ushering in of n broad use of the
new quasi in rem jurisdiction in Louisiana
The North Carolina case is Canterbury v. hlonroe h g e Hnrd~oodImports
Corp., 48 N.C. App. 90, 268 S.E.2d 868 (1980). In that case, both the plnintiE nnd defendant were nonresidents. The p1aint.W sold a quantity of lumber to the defendnnt, and
a t the defendant's request shipped it to North Carolina for processing. When a dispute
arose about whether the plaintiff had delivered a sufficient amount of lumber, the defendant defaulted on the contract and the plaintiff sued attaching the property. Significantly, the plaintiff alleged that attachment was needed not only to obtain juridiction,
but also to prevent the defendant from removing the property to "points unknonn." Id.
a t 91, 268 S.E.2d a t 869. The court e m e d dismisd of the complnint on the ground
that service of process was improper, but in dicta it indicated thnt qunsi in rem jurisdiction would have been proper in the case. The court grounded this conclusion on the c l w
relationship of the property to the underlying controversy, the defendnnt's explicit direction that the property be sent to the state, and the tangible nnture of the property. Id. nt
93-95, 268 S.E.2d a t 870-71.
The case may very well be atypical. N.C. GEN.STAT.
5 1-75.86) (1967) provides that
a trial court has jurisdiction over any action "in which in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction
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voked quasi in rern jurisdiction in the post-Shaffer period,
However, courts in those states have stressed that the doctrine
may be constitutionally exercised." The same statute, in addition, provides for quasi in
rern jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defendant's property within tho stato
or the attachment of a debt owed the defendant in the state. Id. 5 1-75.8(4). But that
provision, which sanctioned quasi in rern jurisdiction in the old fashion of Harris U. Balk,
was held unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme Court immediately after Shaffer. Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322,327,244 S.E.2d 164,167 (1978). In Balcon,
which was the first post-Shaffer case decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court, the
court went out of its way to disparage the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction despito tho
legislative authorization for it. Indeed, the court applied Shaffer retroactively becauso in
its opinion the free wheeling previous use of quasi in rern jurisdiction was "offensive!' Id.
The court also held that, under Shaffer, jurisdiction was not proper in the case before it
since the controversy "had no relation to the realty" attached. Id.
After Balcon, North Carolina courts have continued to be chary in their npprovnl of
quasi in rern jurisdiction. While they have authorized it for the determination of disputos
in which the title or ownership of property is a t issue, Lessard v. Lessard, 68 N.C. App.
760, 316 S.E.2d 96 (1984) (entitlement to estate), or where it is used to adjudicate tho
status of persons in the state, Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 70 N.C. App. 474, 319 S.E,2d
670 (1984) (divorce proceeding), aside from Canterbury, quasi in rern jurisdiction usually
has been denied. See Carroll v. Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453,363 S.E.2d 872 (1988) (moro
presence of property in the state in which the defendant may have an interest is insufficient to support quasi in rern jurisdiction in an equitable distribution action in tho absence of evidence that it was intentionally brought into the state); Cameron-Brown CO,V.
Daves, 83 N.C. App. 281, 350 S.E.2d 111 (1986) (quasi in rern jurisdiction disnpprovod
because the attachment of three checks owed to the defendant was not related to tho
claim); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Eways, 46 N.C. App. 466,470,472,265 S.E.2d
637,640,642 (1980) (jurisdiction based upon the attachment of a "substantial amount of
real property" insufficient to support quasi in rern jurisdiction because tho property was
"too attenuated" to the underlying claim). But see Fraser v. Littlejohn, 96 N.C. App.
377, 386 S.E.2d 230 (1989) (upholding quasi in rern jurisdiction when contacts with tho
state are numerous).
180 In New Hampshire, the case is Hall, Morse, Gallagher & Anderson v. Koch &
Koch, 119 N.H. 639,406 A.2d 962 (1979). Hall was a claim by a law firm for the rocovory
of a fee from a New Hampshire executor to prosecute a wrongful death action. When tho
client hired other counsel who obtained a $250,000 settlement, the plaintiff's law firm
attached the proceeds of the settlement. The court affirmed the use of quasi in rom
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, and held that the attachment of the sottlemont
was "an added factor" in the minimum contacts analysis. Id. a t 644, 406 A.2d at 965
(citing Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978)). Indood,
the attachment provided the boost necessary to obtain jurisdiction since an earlier nction
by the plaintiffs for in personam jurisdiction had been dismissed for failure to satisfy tho
long-arm statute.
Subsequent New Hampshire opinions do not reflect as expansive a view of tho pod
tential of quasi in rern jurisdiction. See Altshuler Genealogical Service v. Farris, 128
N.H. 98, 508 A.2d 1091 (1986) (rejecting quasi in rern jurisdiction sought by attaching
the proceeds of an estate to adjudicate plaintiffs contractual claim for remunoration for
locating heirs); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Abreem Corp., 122 N.H. 583, 449 A.2d 1200
(1982) (no quasi in rern jurisdiction in dispute over a performance bond based upon
attachment of real property in the state unrelated to the cause of action).
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should be used sparingly.leOThe remaining three states, Maryland, Minnesota,le' and Penn~ylvania,'~~
each have laws which
provide clear support for a post-Shaffer use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. However, in none of these three states is quasi in rem
jurisdiction actually in use.le3

D. Overview
In the decade since the landmark opinion in Shaffer, there
have been two competing trends. On the one hand, the majority
of states have either directly abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction,
See notes 186-89 supra.
In both Maryland and hlinnesota there is explicit post-Shoffer Icgislntion authorizing quasi in rem jurisdiction whenever it is constitutionaL In hiarylnnd, nttachment jurisdiction is authorized by statute whenever the debtor is a "nonresident individual,or a corporation which has no resident agent in the state, and.
(3) [tlhe action is
any other in which the attachment is constitutionally permitted." hio. [CTS 6: JUD.
PROC.]CODEANN.5 3-303(b)(3) (1957). hlinesota in 1981, apparently in respolm to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980),
amended its attachment law to provide simply that "[alttachrnent may be used to obtain
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a party to the extent consistent with due process of Innt."
I1IINN. STAT.ANN. 5 570.02 (West 1988).
Nevertheless, despite the broad grant of authority, neither state hns reported opinions in which a plaintiff has successfully sought quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain jurisdiction, probably because both states have broad long-arm statutes &g
qunsi in rem
jurisdiction unnecessary. Both states, unlike New York, have long-nrm statutes that purPROC]
CODEANN.
port to rqch as far as due process permits. See, e.g., h b . [CTS 6: JUD.
3 6-103 (1967, amended 1978); INN. STAT.ANN.5 543.19 (West 1957). See also Geelhwd
v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220,352 k 2 d 818 (1976); State v. Continental Form, Inc, 356 N.W.2d
442 ( M i . Ct. App. 1984). Not surprisingly, therefore, in both states, there is authority
for the proposition that quasi in rem jurisdiction is resewed for situations in which in
personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained because the defendant cannot be located.
Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 hid. 718,720,387 k 2 d 770,771 (1978)
(Attachment proceedings "serve the purpose
of affording creditors tho opportunity
to seize the property of a debtor who cannot be reached by service of process bemuse of
nonresidence or flight."); Rice, Inc v. Intrex, Inc, 257 N.W.2d 370 ( h l i . 1977) (nttnchment used to gain in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporntion).
le2 In Pennsylvania, a series of jurisdictional provisions passed in 1978, grant Pennsylvania courts the power to adjudicate disputes even when there is no in personam jurisdiction if the defendant has land, chattels, documents or stock certificates in the state.
42 PA CONS.STAT.ANN. 5 5302-5305 (Purdon 1978). There is some doubt as to the constitutionality of these laws. The Reviser's notes to these statutes indimto that they are
patterned after a similar set of laws in hfichigan. The hiichigan lans, however, were
struck down as violative of due process. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra.
In addition, here, as in Maryland and Minesota, the act promises more thnn i t apparently gives. There is only one reported case in which the statute was invoked. Sterling
Box Co. v. Touretz, 585 F. Supp. 1230 (W.D. P a 1984).
lS5 See notes 192 and 193 supra.
lm

lS1

..

...
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or while retaining the formal authority to use it, have allowed it
to wither on the vine. This development has been accompanied
by an expansion of state long-arm statutes, and a tightening of
the procedural requirements for pre-judgment attachment. On
the other hand, a minority of states, led by New York, continue
to use quasi in rern jurisdiction, and have been vigorously exploring a new and expansive role for the doctrine in the postShaffer period. Were it not for the latter development, one
might conclude that quasi in rern jurisdiction is effectively a
relic. However, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction offers an alternative vision of the role of the doctrine after Shaffer.Given the
energy and enthusiasm for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction exhibited by New York courts, it may capture the attention and
support of the majority of states that have not yet formally abolished quasi in rern jurisdiction. The final section of this Article
examines which of the two competing visions of quasi in rern
jurisdiction is most appropriate for our time.

Since the new quasi in rern jurisdiction appears to be winning adherents,lg4it may represent the jurisdictional wave of the
future. This is an important juncture, therefore, to examine the
doctrine to determine whether it legitimately charts an appropriate role for quasi in rern jurisdiction after Shaffer.This section undertakes that examination. The new quasi in rern jurisdiction is premised on the notion that attachment jurisdiction
can and should be used to judicially "fill gaps" left by state long
arm statutes that do not extend as far as due process permits.lD0
When this condition exists, the new theory opts for the use of
quasi in rern jurisdiction rather than in personam jurisdiction,lDO
See notes 175-92 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 142, 150-58 and accompanying text supra. Of course, New York courts
themselves have not consistently adhered to this theory. Some courts havo authorized
quasi in rern jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction existed under the long arm statute. See notes 159-60 and accompanying text supra. T o the extent that these cases authorize quasi in rern jurisdiction when there is no "gap" to fill, they lack any theoretical
justification and may indeed be unconstitutional. See notes 206-22 and accompanying
text infra.
lea The choice of quasi in rern over in personam jurisdiction is not obvious. This ie
so because it is no longer possible, as it was before Shaffer, to avoid the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe by resort to quasi in rern jurisdiction. See notos 6883 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, if quasi in rern jurisdiction is sought, it
lM

lBK
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provided only that the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction occurs in
situations in which minimum contacts exist betnteen the forum,
the defendant and the claim.1s7 The new quasi in rern jurisdiction accepts the power of the courts to create new rationales for
the doctrine without direct legislative action.
This section demonstrates that there is no longer any valid
theory for quasi in rern jurisdiction, and that it should be abolished. The new theory cannot withstand analysis for three reasons: (1) it is probably unconstitutional, (2) it represents bad
policy and is wasteful, and (3) it violates the doctrine of separation of powers because the question of whether there is a "gap"
in a state's long arm jurisdiction is to be determined by the state
legislature, not the courts.

A. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional Because It
Deprives the Defendant of the Use of Property Prior to
Judgment
Quasi in rem jurisdiction requires the use of attachment of
the defendant's property.lS8 In personam jurisdiction does not.
must be in circumstances in which in personam jurisdiction also would be constitutionally permissible. After Shaffer, both in personam and quasi in rern jurisdiction must
comport with this constitutional standard. See notes 67-83 nnd occompnnying t a t
supra.
The one exception to this would be if there were a lesser due p r m minimum
contacts standard for quasi in rern jurisdiction than for in personam jurhdiction. Wide
the possibility of such a standard developing after Shafferwas suggested by seveml commentators, see, e.g., Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t 1203-0.6; Silberman, supra note 3, a t
71-77, in the decade or more afterward, no court has indicated nny ~
~ ervhntever
s s
to develop the thought.
l* See notes 134-61 and accompanying text supra.
lgs Professor Silberman has questioned this requirement. Silbermm, supm note 3,
a t 46-47. She argues that i t is the presence of the property within the state thnt should
provide the predicate for quasi in rern jurisdiction not its seizure. It is true thnt without
attachment the property may be disposed of prior to judgment. Horvever, the same p a sibility of obtaining a worthless judgment exists with in personam jurisdiction. After d,
there is no guarantee that the defendant will not disappear after service of proms. Since
this possibility has never been considered sufficient to defeat in personam jurkdiction,
Professor Siberman argues that i t not defeat quasi in rern jurisdiction either. As she
puts it: "The mere presence of property in the state should supply nn ndequnte bask for
quasi in rern jurisdiction irrespective of whether the property is subsequently sold or
otherwise unavailable as security for enforcement." Id. a t 47. At the time of Pennoyer,
attachment was also thought necessary to provide notice to the defendnnt of the pendency of the action particularly since it was thought a t the time that p r o w s could not
be lawfully served outside of the state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878).
But this rationale no longer holds true as process after International Shoe can be served
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Attachment is a powerful remedy.lDBIt is difficult to overestimate the disruption and mischief that an order of attachment
can entail:
Attachment n o t only restricts a defendant's use of property; it also
can cause a devastating impact on a d e f e n d a n t .
Attachment of a
bank account m a y cause checks to bounce, enrage employees who cann o t b e paid or otherwise disrupt ongoing business relations
The
disruption of business and acceleration of debts exert powerful pressure on the defendant to settle prior to a n y adjudication of the
dispute.'OO

...

... .

When quasi in rem jurisdiction is used to fill a gap in a state's
long arm statute, it allows the plaintiff not only to bring suit in
extraterritorially.
Nevertheless, attachment remains a firmly rooted, indispensable attribute of quasi
& G. HAZARD,
CIVILPROCEDURE
76-77 n.8 (3d ed. 1986).
in rem jurisdiction. See F. JAMES
But see the one reported exception to this rule, Wiggins v. Dojcsan, 411 So. 2d 894 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), discussed a t note 186 supra.
lee Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute: A Pre-judgment Remedy in
Need of Further Revision, 44 BROOKLYN
L. REV.199, 202 (1978).
looId. Following Fuentes, many states amended their attachment laws to provido
greater due process protections to defendants. In New York, for example, a threo-judgo
federal court declared New York's attachment statute unconstitutional. Sugar v. Curtie
Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), remanded, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). Thoro.
after, in 1977, the legislature amended the statute to provide greater procedural protections. The amendment provided for attachment without notice, but tho plaintiff must
move within ten days after the levy, with notice as directed by the court, to the defondant and garnishee, for an order confirming the order of attachment. CPLR 6211(b). Tho
plaintiff, in addition, must give an undertaking in an amount fixed by the court nnd not
less than five hundred dollars, which will be paid to the defendant if the dofondant rocovers judgment, or if it is finally decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to attach tho
defendant's property. The defendant in such a case can recover all costs and damages,
including reasonable attorney fees. CPLR 6212(b) & (d). Upon n motion to vacate or
modify an order of attachment, CPLR 6223(b) places the burden of proof on the plaintiff
to establish the grounds for the attachment, the need for continuing tho levy, and tho
probability that he will succeed on the merits. These provisions, which apply to quasi in
rem jurisdiction attachments, were inserted to ensure that New York was in complianco
with these procedural due process requirements.
In 1984, the legislature amended the attachment act to provide additional protoctions to defendants in quasi in rem cases. CPLR 6211(b), as amended, shortens tho time
for service on the defendant of notice of the attachment from ten to five days. The ordor
of attachment is to be vacated if the plaintiff fails to move to confirm, or t o apply for tho
one extension permitted. The legislative intent in enacting these amendments was to
bring New York's quasi in rem laws into compliance with Shaffer. See N.Y. Cn. PRAC.L.
& R. 6211 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989) (Commentary). However, even with thsso
safeguards, some have questioned whether the amendments to the New York Stato at.
tachment law fully remedies the due process procedural problems identified in tho provious law. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 199.
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the forum, but also to tie up the defendant's property throughout the litigation. In modern commercial or tort litigation this
can result in seizure of substantial property.201The availability
of jurisdictional attachment can easily entice the most honorable
plaintiff to use it as a security device, or to coerce the defendant
into a settlement that could not be obtained without attachment.202Given these problems, it is difficult to just@ quasi in
rem jurisdiction when the sole rationale for its use is to obtain
jurisdiction to adjudicate a ~ l a i m . 2
This
~ ~ is particularly so when
one considers that in personam jurisdiction could just as easily
be used to accomplish the same objective without any of these
painful side effe~ts.~"
Because of its dependency on pre-judgment attachment,
there are serious,206 and as yet not fully explored,?OOconstituIn New York, for example, the values of attached property are often in the millions of dollars. See, e.g., Cargill, I n c v. Sabiine Trading 6: Shipping &., 756 F.2d 224
(2d Ci.1985) (two and one-half million dollar bank account); Tmpirnex Oil Limited v.
Latina Trading Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (one nnd one-hall million dollar bank account); Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65,464
N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (eight million dollar bank nccount).
'02 Silberman, supra note 3, a t 59 11.132 ("[Tlhe advantage of tying up the defendant's property may make attachment an attractive alternative for n plnintif, nnd n Turkdictional attachment' may permit a plaintiff to avoid the henring requirements or statutory limitations of some security statutes. At least one court hns winked a t this
subterfuge."); Zamrnit, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, supra note 26, nt 682 (“[Quasi in rem
attachment] has been permitted under the guise of jurisdictional nttnchment when, in
reality, its only purpose has been as a security device
.'3.
With appropriate procedural safeguards i t is not a due process violntion to use
attachment for purposes other than obtaining jurisdiction. These purpases cnn indude,
for example, attachment to prevent destruction or secretion of property. See notes 20%
21 and accompanying text infra.
2M As one commentator pointed out, attachment is not needed for jurisdiction
"when in personam jurisdiction is available through the minimum contncts npprmch and
service of process by the use of a long arm statute!' Comment, Q u a i in Rem Jurisdietion and Due Process Requirements, 82 YACELJ. 1023, 1032 (1973).
The New York State Judicial Conference in its review of thnt stnte's nttnchment
law observed that the due process issues involving nttnchment are "especially ncute"
because:
The property of the defendant subject to seizure in attachment unquestionably
belongs to the defendant, not the plaintiff. It is not the subject of the action,
and is related only peripherally to the plaintiff's clnim insofar ns i t may prsvide a basis for exercising jurisdiction and secure the enforcement of pEntiU's
claim.
N.Y. STATE
JUD.
CONP.REP.M THE 1977 LEGISLATURE
IN -TION
TO TItE ~ I Y I LPRAmCE
LAW AND RULES,
in N.Y. LEGIS. D o c No. 90, a t 250 (1977).
Indeed, the Shaffer court itself carefully reserved tbis issue, Shaffer, 433 US. n t
189, but curiously it seems to have been largely overlooked by litigants rind courts in the

.. .
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tional problems that arise from the use of the new quasi in rem
jurisdiction. There is little doubt that pre-judgment attachment
implicates constitutionally protected property interests of the
defendant.207A spate of 1970s decisions by the Supreme Court
teach that any state statute which permits the pre-judgment attachment of a defendant's property must serve some rational
purpose, .and even then, the statute must provide procedural
safeguards that precede the seizure.208This is so because of the
post-Shaffer era. It is difficult to understand why courts and commentators havo not
spent more time on this question. Perhaps they have been stymied by the Supromo
Court's dicta in Fuentes that no pre-hearing requirement exists when attachment is
sought for jurisdictional purposes since this use of attachment "serve[s] a most basic and
important public interest." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67'91 n.23 (1972) (citing Owonby
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
339 (1968).
There are two reasons why the Fuentes dicta does not "rest
on a roasoned oxtension of. . . fundamental analysis." Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond:
The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA.L. REV.355,366 (1973). First, Owenby, tho
case relied on by Fuentes, was decided over two decades prior to International Shoe at a
time when quasi in rem jurisdiction still served an important role in alleviating the artificial strictures of the Pennoyer doctrine. As Professors Clark and Landers point out,
"Owenby might well have been justified in the Pennoyer v. Neff 'jurisdiction-is-powor'
milieu, but that time has long since passed." Id. a t 367.
Second, Owenby itself does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited by the
Fuentes and Sniadach courts. Owenby involved a 1915 Delaware attachment law which
not only permitted quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment, but also required the defendant to post a bond before being allowed to defend the action on the merits. It was
this latter provision that the defendant in Owenby challenged, not the unquestionod
power, a t that time, to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction through attachment. See Shafler,
433 U.S. a t 194 n.lO.
Nevertheless, the apparent approval of Owenby by the Fuentes Court has immunized the issue from sustained critical analysis. Even those commentators and courts
that have examined the issue have not confronted the question head on, but have instead
limited their focus to the far more narrow proposition of what kind of hearing is constitutionally required prior to the use of attachment for jurisdictional purposes. They have
thereby lost sight of the larger question of whether in the age of full minimum contacts
in in personam jurisdiction there is any need, with or without a hearing, for quasi in ram
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore, Procedural Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions After
ShafTer v. Heitner, 20 WM.& MARYL. REV.157 (1978). But see Bourne, The Demise of
L. REV.141 (1987).
Foreign Attachment, 21 CREIGHTON
20'
See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Supreme Court held that pre-judgment attachmont as
part of a replevin action was unconstitutional in the absence of procedural safeguards.
The Court, in imposing on the state the obligation to provide some pre-deprivation procedure, made clear that the purpose of the inquiry is to "protect against arbitrary doprivations of property." Fuentes, 407 U.S. a t 81. The Court in its subsequent opinions "offected a slight retreat" on the precise procedural protections that must accompany tho
seizure. Silberman, supra note 3, a t 56. However, it has continued to adhere to the fun-

...
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basic due process principle that forbids the state from arbitrary
deprivations of property.209This right is broad enough to cover
the temporary deprivations of property involved in pre-judgment attachment to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court held in Fuentes v. Shevin, "[tlhe Fourteenth
Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or
50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the state is within the purview of the due process
Although the state obviously has a legitimate interest in
providing a means of obtaining jurisdiction in its courts,"'l quasi
in rem jurisdiction is not a rational method for serving that interest, especially when in personam jurisdiction can be used for
the same purposes. It is no answer to say, as New York courts
have, that quasi in rem jurisdiction is needed to f
ll the gaps of
in personam long arm statutes. These "gaps" represent voluntary choices of the legislature. The gaps are not the result of
constitutional limitations on the legislature that passed the
acts.212This justification for the constitutionality of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, therefore, bootstraps the decision of the legislature
to limit its long arm statute into a finding of constitutional necessity for an alternative form of jurisdiction.21s One commentator has bluntly characterized the argument for quasi in rem jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction is available as a "sham
which should not be tolerated."214
damental notion, underlying all of its opinions in this field, thnt the state may not nuthorize arbitrary deprivations of property even if the taking is limited in time nnd scope.
See generally North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem Inc, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (due
process is needed to guard against erroneous deprivations of property); hlitchell v. 1V.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (procedures that minimize the possibility that property
will be taken without justification are constitutional).
See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
A~IERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAIY3 10-7 (2d ed. 1988) (The due
process clause protects lie, liberty, and property from "arbitrary government nction.").
210 Fuentes, 407 U
.S. a t 86.
211 Id. a t 91 n.23.
212 See notes 40-44and accompanying text supra.
zlS As Professor Bourne has remarked, "[a] state which deliberately forgoes this SOlution [providing full in personam jurisdiction in its long arm statute] is hardly in a
position to say that summary deprivations are 'necessary to secure' jurisdiction b c a w e
it could easily get jurisdiction without imposing such deprivntions." Bourne, supra note
206, a t 168-69.
2M Zammit, supra note 13, a t 18-19.See also Bourne, supra note 206, a t 163-65Interestingly, one New York court in effect supported this point when it invdidnted on
order of attachment to obtain quasi in rem jurisdicti~nover n. foreign corporation nfter
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It is also no answer to say that quasi in rem jurisdiction is
necessary to prevent the out-of-state defendant from fleeing,
from removing property from the jurisdiction, or from secreting
assets. If any of these factors can be established in a particular
case, they justify attachment, not for the purpose of jurisdiction,
These possibilities do not make quasi
but rather for
in rem attachment automatically necessary unless one is prepared to accept that these dangers are present in every case
against an out-of-state resident who has property in the state.
Plainly such presumptions are not accurate. The common sense
observation that "[mlany defendants are simply too heavily involved in local affairs to pull up stakes and
makes it ludicrous to argue that quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary in
every case to prevent a defendant from fleeing or removing ass e t ~The
. ~ Constitution
~ ~
forbids such irrebuttable and discriminatory presumption^.^^^
Finally, it is no answer to say that attachment is needed to
enable the plaintiff to obtain an enforceable judgment against a
nonresident defendant. For one thing, as the Shaffer court
pointed out, the full faith and credit clause means that a judgment obtained in one jurisdiction where there are no assets to
satisfy the claim must be enforced by other jurisdictions where
assets exist.21e Thus, even if all nonresident defendants were
tempted to remove their assets from the forum jurisdiction, the
resulting judgments would still be enforceable. Furthermore,
this argument suffers from the same impediments as the earlier
argument that assumed nonresidents would always remove their
the corporation qualified itself to do business in New York, and therefore bocamo subject
to in personam jurisdiction. Brastex Corp. v. Allen Int'l, Inc., 702 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1983).
215 The Supreme Court held as much in Shaffer. See notes 73-74 and accompanying
text supra. See also Fuentes, 407 U.S.a t 92 (Statutes providing protections against dostruction or concealment of property must be "narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual
condition.").
2'e Bourne, supra note 206, a t 166 n.164.
In Intermeat Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), for
example, "it was unlikely that the poultry company was going to abandon tho New York
market to avoid suit in New York." Bourne, supra note 206, a t 166 11.164. Moreovor,
even if this were not true, the argument for quasi in rem jurisdiction erroneously assumes that "such removal of property would necessarily eliminate jurisdiction basod on
the earlier presence of property in the state, an assumption which is clearly illogical." Id.
a t 167.
218 See, e.g., id. a t 185-91, 206-10.
218 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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property to avoid jurisdiction. It simply does not accord with
real world facts to treat "all nonresidents sued in a state's courts
as presumptive absconders . . . .,3220
Thus, there is no legitimate governmental purpose supporting the use of pre-judgment attachment solely for jurisdictional
purposes. While there is contrary authority,2" careful analysis
demonstrates that "both substantive and procedural due process
require the elimination of quasi in rem juri~diction."~~~

B. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Represents Bad Policy and Is
Wasteful Because It Invites Multiple Litigation on a Single Claim and Causes Unnecessary Satellite Litigation
Because it has limited res judicata
a quasi in rem
judgment constitutes a wasteful use of scarce judicial resources.
When quasi in rem jurisdiction is used, if the claim exceeds the
value of the property attached, a successful plaintiff is not prohibited from N i g a second action on the same claim to collect
the difference. Moreover, a plaintiff who was unsuccessful in the
first action, may try to establish liability in a new forum.224For
the same reason, quasi in rem jurisdiction often allows a defendant to file a limited appearance in the first action, and yet remain free to relitigate liability in a second forum after losing the
case in the first state.226With an in personam action, by conBourne, supra note 206, a t 170.
Id. a t 158 n.122 (citing cases).
Zarnrnit, supra note 26, a t 683. For these reasons, several commentntors hnve
suggested that the legislature can no longer constitutionally authorize qunsi in rem jurisdiction pre-judgment attachment. See, e.g., Clark 6: Landers, supra note 206, a t 361;
Zammit, supra note 26, a t 682-83.
nS A quasi in rem judgment is limited to the value of the property attached. See
note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, supra note 204, a t 1032 n.65.
x24 This fact may encourage a p l a i n t s with n weak claim to deliberately choose to
"bring several quasi in rem suits, hoping to prevail in one." hloore, supra note 206, a t
182.
225 If the defendant chooses to appear without reservation, the resulting judgment is
b i d i n g for the entire amount of the claim. F. J ~ a i 6:
~ sG. tIAZhRD,supra note 198, a t
628. If, however, the defendant makes a limited appearance in the first action, the resulting judgment is not res judicata for the reason that: "the court's authority is the property itself, the court cannot purport to determine the clnim itself; the judgmept determines only whether the defendant retains the property [if defendnnt r;ins] or plnintia
takes it [if p l a i n t s wins] . . . ." Id. Accord RESTA~IEHP(SECOND)
OP J U D C L5~ ?
32(2) (1982).
The more difficult question is determining whether issues litigated in a qunsi in rern
judgment should be precluded in a subsequent action. The dnnger of doing so is thnt i t
22'

Heinonline - - 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1111 1989-1990

1112

'

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56: 1059

trast, there can only be one action since the assertion of jurisdiction makes the defendant subject to liability for the entire
Multiple litigation on a single claim might have been acceptable before the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, but it
is no longer tolerable because it is inherently unfair to both the
plaintiff and defendant. The risk that a jury in a second action
may return an inconsistent verdict renders the process unfair to
a successful plaintiff. The unfairness to a defendant is similar,
but also includes the burden of having to defend two actions not
of the defendant's own choosing. It is precisely these twin disadvantages that the res judicata rules are designed to preventaaa7
gives the quasi in rern judgment "an added 'bootstrap' effectiveness in subsequent litigation" that can be unfair when the defendant was granted a limited appearance. F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD,
supra note 198, a t 628. On the other hand, "if the determinations aro not
given conclusive effect then the issues involved will have to be tried twice." Id. at 629. As
Professors James and Hazard state, "there is no good solution to the problem which
arises from the anomalous nature of attachment jurisdiction itself." Id.
The position of the drafters of the Restatement of Judgments is that issuo proclusion will be invoked if the defendant made a limited appearance and contested the quasi
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 32(3) (1982). Others, howevor,
in rern actions. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
disagree. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (no issuo
preclusion when the first action was a quasi in rern case under the Seider doctrino); J,
FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE& A. MILLER,supra note 100, a t 600 ("It has been suggested that
it is improper to permit such a judgment to have even collateral estoppel effect since
that is inconsistent with the notion of a limited appearance and may be unfair."); Dovolopments in the Law, supra note 40, a t 954-55 ("[Ilt seems fair that a plaintiff who has
elected to take advantage of the quasi in rern procedure in a particular forum should
thereafter be precluded by an adverse judgment, although a judgment in his favor would
not bind the defendant beyond the value of his property.").
In New York, the evident intent of the legislature in providing the right to mako a
limited appearance to a defendant in a quasi in rern action was that tho judgment would
have no issue preclusion effect. As Dean (now Judge) McLaughlin wrote:
[I]t would be anomalous to hold that while the defendant may make a limited
appearance, if he loses, that judgment may nevertheless be used offensivoly
against him in a subsequent action. T o give the first judgment such sweeping
effect would allow the defendant in the second action to litigate only tho qucstion of damages, his liability having been conclusively established. In practical
effect, the first judgment would be virtually in personam.
LAWSOP NEW
McLaughlin, Practice Commentary to CPLR 320(c)(l), CONSOLIDATED
YORK381 (McKinney 1972).
22s RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS
§ 17 (1982).
The purpose of the res judicata doctrine is to "bring an end to controversy" after
the parties have been given an opportunity with full due process protections to try the
& G. HAZARD,
supra note 198, a t 590. The reason for this is that: "a
action once. F. JAMES
judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignoro it
M. KANE& A. MILLER,
and to litigate the same claims again and again." J. FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 100, at 615. It is true that according a quasi in rern judgment issuo preclusion

Heinonline - - 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1112 1989-1990

19901

NEW QUASI I N REAf JUK~SDICTION

1113

The heavy burden placed on the judicial system is another
reason why the escape from normal res judicata principles permitted by quasi in rern jurisdiction fails to advance any legitimate state objective. In a time that is characterized by burgeoning caseloadsZZB
and shrinking resources, the res judicata
doctrine limiting litigants to one bite a t the apple is of "critical
importance."22BDean Carrington's observation that quasi in rem
jurisdiction allows "a result very much a t odds with the modern
concept of res judi~ata"~~O
is more painfully true today than it
was when it was first made over a quarter of a century ago. In
light of the free availability of in personam jurisdiction, quasi in
rem jurisdiction should be rejected because it is a t war with this
fundamental principle of finality that undergirds modern civil

effect would mitigate the problem of multiple litigation somewhot. However, a t least for
persons who file limited appearances, this is not a fair solution to the problem. The basis
of a quasi in rern judgment, after all, is the presence of the property in the jurisdiction.
If, however, full issue preclusion is given to quasi in rem judgments, thii rule would
make a quasi in rern action into an in personam action with the added benefit of nttnchment. In effect, this would permit that which the state by labeling the proceeding q u a i
in rem, purports to prohibit. As others have mitten, thii is simply unfair. See note 202
supra.
"B
By some accounts, almost twelve million Ian-suits nre filed each year in the
United States. COUNCIL
ON THE ROLEOF COURTS.THEROLEOF COURTSIN &IERICAN SOCIETY 2 (1982) (11.7 million civil cases were filed in general jurisdiction state courts in
1976). In New York alone in 1987, over 3.5 million actions were filed in state court.
Carlisle, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes Under New Yorh's
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOKLYN
L REV. 95, 96 n.5 (1988).
228 J. FRIEDENTHAL,M. KANE& A. MILLER,
supra note lQQ,
nt 615.
Carrington, supra note 45, a t 314.
This conclusion remains true whether or not a limited appeamnce is permitted in
quasi in rern actions. As previously noted, a limited appearance is n provision that dlor;s
a defendant in a quasi in rern action to defend the action on the merits without exposure
to full in' personam jurisdiction. See notes 225-27 and accompanying t a t supra.
There has been much debate among scholars and courts ns to whether n "limited
appearance" should be allowed in quasi in rem actions. Compare Note, "'Special" Appearances to Contest the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. PA.L REV. 403 (1933) (nrguing that limited appearances should be permitted) uith Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem
Under Section 1655, Title 28 U.S.C., 50 hlrcit L REV. 1, 22-24 (1951) (arguing thnt
limited appearances should not be allowed because a trial of the clnim should fully determine the contentions between the parties). However, no mntter how this debate is resolved the irrationality of quasi in rern jurisdiction remains.
If, on the one hand, a limited appearance is allowed, as is the w e in most jurisdictions that have used quasi in rern jurisdiction, Developments in the Law, supra note 40,
a t 955, then the res judicata problems already identified remnin. See note 8 and a w m panying text supra. Since it means that the judgment will probably hnve no elnim or
issue preclusion consequences, it "becomes a bonus to the defendant," thnt can be used
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In addition to the limited res judicata effect of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, these "antique categorizations also lack utility"a3s
and efficiency because they "invite prolonged preliminary litigation"233 on matters that are unnecessary to the just resolution of
the claim. Before Shaffer,when quasi in rern jurisdiction could
be invoked without minimum contacts analysis based solely on
the presence of property in the state, even critics of the doctrine
were forced to concede that quasi in rern jurisdiction had the
virtue of simplicity of appli~ation.~~'
However, the new quasi in
rern jurisdiction, which of necessity must be based upon a minimum contacts analysis, clearly lacks this certainty. In fact, as it
has been developed by New York courts, and by those few states
that have passed quasi in rern jurisdiction statutes since Shaffer,
every quasi in rern case is automatically turned into a constitutional case, forcing the court and the parties to engage in a complex search through the vagaries of that doctrine to determine
whether or not jurisdiction is present.236The search is even more
as "an archaic shield" against liability for the entire amount of the claim. Comment,
Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment Jurisdiction Based on Property, and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up The Ghost of the
Res?, 27 BUFFALO
L. REV.323, 339 (1978).
If, on the other hand, a limited appearance is prohibited, as some jurisdictions have
done, Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 953, then the res judicata difficulty is
eliminated, but a t an extremely heavy price. In this scenario, the state has effectively
coerced the defendant into acquiescing to the assertion of full in personam jurisdiction
over him because if he declines the chance to defend, he forfeits his interest in tho property that has been attached. And, a t the same time, it has provided the plaintiff with tho
unfair bonus of pre-judgment attachment which would not have been permitted had tho
state forthrightly authorized in personam jurisdiction in the first place.
232 Note, supra note 45, a t 1412.
Zammit, supra note 26, a t 682.
234 Professor Carrington made note of this point when he wrote:
quasi in rem jurisdicThe most forceful argument for the preservation o f .
tion is [its] simplicity. Future lawmakers may conclude that our present effort
to rationalize the choice of forum has failed: that the time and energy devoted
to resolving disputes about fairness and accessibility are excessivo costs for tho
benefits derived.
Carrington, supra note 45, at 309. In Shaffer, Justice Marshall acknowledged this argument, but rejected it because "the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding tho jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is
too high." Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t 211.
This is so because New York courts have developed the new quasi in rem jurisdiction without any legislative direction. See notes 134-70and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, those states that have passed quasi in rern jurisdiction statutes since Shaffer
have not specified any standards for its use other than a declaration that it is available
whenever it is constitutional. See notes 191-93and accompanying text supra.

..
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difficult and wasteful here than when it is undertaken in an in
personam case because if intangible property is the basis of the
attachment, a court is also forced into the necessity of resolving
questions that would never arise in an in personam case. These
include such inquiries as determining the situs of the propert~,2
and
~ ~whether it has been brought into the forum intent i ~ n a l l y Arcane
. ~ ~ ~ questions such as this, which can be avoided
by in personam jurisdiction under a carefully defined long arm
statute, produce a "substantial amount of uneconomic dispute
not pertaining to the merits."238

The determination of whether or not minimum contacts are present in m y given
case is no easy task, as any first year law student who hns struggled with the predictnble
question on this topic in a Civil Procedure exam can attest. The Supreme Court hns not
helped make the task any easier. The Court in its post-International Shoe cnses hns sent
"mixed signals about how fairness and justice [are] to be determined." Greenstcin, The
Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 I-kmh'csU.855,
856 (1987). The decisions have been called "arbitrary." Jay, "hfinimum Contacts" as a
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction. A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429,464 (1981),
"muddled", Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process Determination of Jurisdiction Ouer the Person, 59 'haw. LQ.47.53 (19861, and "grounded in
faulty logic." Id. a t 57. One commentator has even compared the Supreme Court's minimum contacts jurisprudence to hfacduff's lament in Macbeth that "[c]onfusion now hnth
made its masterpiece." Perdue, supra note 26, a t 479 (quoting W. SSHAKESP- hhcBETH, Act 11, scene Ti). Courts, too, have criticized an approach thnt rnnkes every jurisdictional case into a constitutional minimum contacts case. See, e.g., Tnylor v. Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967). Nevertheless, some states, California
being the best known, have drafted long arm statutes that provide for in personam jurisdiction to the full limits of due process. See R CASAD,supra note 41, at 4-4 n.13. T h w
statutes are subject to the same criticism that is now leveled ngninst the new q u a i in
rem jurisdiction.
When intangible property, such as was involved in Shaffer, forms the property
that is attached for quasi in rem jurisdiction, then the inquiry inevitnbly becomes on
assessment of whether there can be a seizure "of something that can be seized only metnphorically." Lowenfeld, supra note 13, a t 122. Determinntions of the situs of these intangibles "are even harder than the problems that [the Shaffer Court] nddressed in undertaking its new look a t quasi in rem actions." Id. See also Developments in the h r ~ ,
supra note 40, a t 955-56 (pointing out "the difficulty of determining rvhero properly is
situated" for jurisdictional purposes).
Thii is obviously an important question given the "purposeful avnilment" branch
of the minimum contacts test. See generally Smit, supra note 13, a t 525 ("When n creditor does not control the movements of hi debtor, he connot fnirly be regarded ns hnving
exposed to suit . . .the debt owed by the debtor. Therefore, in cases of transient intangibles the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction becomes particularly hnrd to defend.'').
*" Carrington, supra note 45, a t 309. See also Younger, Quasi in Rem Defaults After ShaEer v. Heitner: Some Unanswered Qubtions, 45 BROOKLYN
L Rev. 675, 677
(1979) (pointing out that the minimum contacts standard of Shaffer "lncbs predictability. In cases of quasi in rem jurisdiction, lawyers henceforth will need to worry nbout
questions the mere asking of which would have been regarded ns excessively imogbative
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Thus, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction doctrine lacks support in wise public policy because it wastefully encourages multiple litigation and preliminary litigation over unnecessary issues. For these reasons many thoughtful commentators have
proposed its elimination even when authorized by the legislat ~ r e An
. ~additional
~ ~
oddity of the new quasi in rern jurisdiction, however, is that it has developed almost entirely without
any legislative approval. The next section examines the significance of this fact.

C . Judge-Made Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Is Improper Judicial Lawmaking and Violates Separation of Powers
The pathway for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction has been
cleared largely through judicial decision-making by New York
courts acting on their own without any legislative authorizat i ~ n . ~Even
~ O if there were a continuing need for quasi in rern
j u r i s d i ~ t i o n ,it~ ~
should
~
not be judicially imposed. The fundabefore ShafTer.").
230 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 45, a t 321 (Quasi in rern jurisdiction is "out of
."); Von Mehren & Trautman,
step . . . with the modern quest for a fair forum
supra note 40, at 1178 ("Ultimately, all that should remain of Pennoyer u. Neff, Harris
v. Balk, and their progeny is specific jurisdiction to secure assets against dissipation and
concealment while a controversy is being litigated in an appropriate forum."); Zammit,
supra note 26, a t 683 ("The institution of quasi in rern jurisdiction has outlived its usofulness."); Note, supra note 45, a t 1424 ("The abolition of quasi in rern jurisdiction
would go far toward eliminating the unreasonable hardship imposed on the defendant by
this rule."); Developments in the Law, supra note 40, a t 955-56(calling for a unification
of jurisdictional concepts because quasi in rern jurisdiction is "unrealistic and inadoquato

...

...

. . .").

This is not to say that quasi in rern jurisdiction does not have any important rolo to
play in the jurisdictional scheme when it is put to uses other than general dispute purposes. When quasi in rern jurisdiction is used for specific property purposos such as tho
determination of title to a piece of property, or for attachment to enforce a judgmont, or
as security for a judgment to be obtained when there are legitimate grounds for approhension that the defendant is about to abscond or secrete the property attached, thoro is
not the same reason for concern. Indeed, the Shaffer court itself took pains to mako clear
that its opinion was not disturbing these uses of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Shaffer, 433
U.S. a t 208-09.
240 See notes 133-93and accompanying text supra. Although after Shaffer quasi in
rern jurisdiction has been authorized by the legislatures of three other states, Minnesota,
North Carolina and Pennsylvania, it has not been utilized in those states. See notes 188,
191-92and accompanying text supra.
For the reasons advanced earlier in this section, quasi in rern jurisdiction no
longer has a legitimate role to play in the determination of state court jurisdiction, See
notes 198-239 and accompanying text supra. Assuming, however, for the purposes of
analysis that it does retain contemporary validity, this portion of the Article maintains
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mental policy determination involved in jurisdictional matters
ought to be, and historically has been, in the province of state
legislatures, not the courts.
There is a long-standing tradition in this country to leave
the task to defining the contours of each state's extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the legislature. After Intermtional Shoe created
additional possibilities for in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents, it was the state legislatures, not state courts, that decided
what portion, if any, of that jurisdiction each of the states would
claim.242While this proposition has largely been assumed with
little dis~ussion,2~~
the decision to assign the task to the legislative process rests on sound principles. There are two reasons
why courts should not be permitted to act alone in this field.
First, the legislature has a greater ability to formulate relatively precise standards. Rather than being forced to formulate
concepts on a case-by-case basis, the legislature has the ability
to specify in advance the specific criteria that d
l lead to a
proper assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.244Without legislative guidance, the courts are left with only the vague outlines of
the minimum contacts, substantial justice and fair play standards of the Supreme Court's decisions. Courts forced to rely
entirely on such criteria are unable to give clear definition to the
boundaries of a state's jurisdiction to potential litigants.245
that this determination ought to be made by the legislntures not the courts. See notes
242-74 and accompanying text infra.
242 The legislative response to Intermtional Shoe is revealed in long nrm statutes
which are now found in every state in the union. For a description of these lnr;r;, see R
CASAD,supra note 41, a t $8 7.01-9.12.
24S This point is so obvious that it is often made almost without any consideration
that it would be otherwise. An example is found in an exhaustive treatment of state
court jurisdiction by the editors of the Harvnrd Law Review in 1960. Developments in
the Law, supra note 40, a t 909. In that review, the authors mite "Within the limits
imposed by the due-process and commerce chuses of the Constitution and by federal
statutes the states are free to regulate the business of their courts. The state legislature
must therefore define those situations in which its courts have tho power to render a
judgment." Id. a t 998 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
A similar hesitancy to impose judge-made jurisdictional rules prevails in the f e d e d
system. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolf 6: 60.. 484 U.S. 97, 109 (1987)
(pointing out that "a legislative grant of authority is necesnry" for rules concerning jurisdiction over non-resident defendants).
244 Chase, supra note 13, a t 635 n.90.
246 See note 235 and accompanying text supra. When courts nre left to themselves
"to develop rules on the basis of only the most generalized standards," court-impsxd
solutions mean that the essential element of predictability is largely lost. Chme, supra
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The inevitable unpredictability that results when courts are
forced to decide cases on the basis of vague standards is troubling on two counts. First, unpredictability increases the already
high cost of litigation by encouraging court challenges to juriswhen [these disdiction. This is "especially unpleasant
putes] arise from a procedural rule; procedure is, after all, supposed to advance the goals of efficiency and fairness in litigation,
not stand in their
Second, vague standards impose an
unfair and artificial barrier to business planning, which must inevitably take into account the impact of jurisdictional rules on
where a potential dispute might be resolved.247
The New York development of the new quasi in rem jurisdiction is a case study of the disutility of permitting the judiciary to unilaterally develop this doctrine. The standards that
have emerged from the cases are imprecise and conf~sed?'~
While legislation might not cure these uncertainties entirely, a
carefully crafted statute could go a long way toward bringing
greater certitude to the
There are situations, to be sure, in which courts have developed bodies of law based upon open-ended standards.260In those
situations, unpredictability is simply the price that our system
pays for the benefits that flow from the judicial process. In addition, even when the legislature does act, absolute predictability
obviously cannot be achieved. Thus, unpredictability of judicially developed standards for the new quasi in rem jurisdiction
is by no means a fatal criticism in itself. However, there is a
second, and in some ways even more important, reason that
courts should not blaze new trails with quasi in rem jurisdiction:
the choices that are involved in forging the new doctrine are decisions that in a democracy should be determined in a representative body rather than the courts.
Procedural choices may seem "neutral," but they clearly are

...

note 13, at 634.
'* Id. at 635.
Id. at 634.
See notes 162-70 and accompanying text supra.
This, of course, assumes that the legislature would choose after Shaffer to onact
such a statute, and that it would be constitutional for it to do so. As discussed earlior,
these are unlikely assumptions. See notes 198-239 and accompanying text supra.
a60 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Due process cannot bo
defined with "exactness."). ,
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not. "[Mlore is involved in a change in jurisdictional reach than
a reflection of changing te~hnology."~"Such decisions involve
considerations of sophisticated social, economic and political issues. Does a state want to provide wide access to suits against
nonresidents? Will doing so provide a benefit that it rrjshes to
bestow on important commercial interests in the state?20aWhat
d
lbe the economic impact on the judicial system for the state's
taxpayers if one course rather than another is taken? The legislature can better "assemble and evaluate data that should bear
on these issues, such as the questions about impact on commercial activity within the state."26s
With quasi in rem jurisdiction, these questions take on an
added dimension. Since, as a practical matter, quasi in rem jurisdiction is only invoked when the defendant has substantial assets in the jurisdiction, the decision to permit its use, for the
most part, benefits creditors.16Vroviding these creditors with
another means, and possibly an additional forum, for pursuing
their debtors puts a powerful added weapon in their arsenal.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction offers creditors a greater choice of
where to sue their out-of-state debtors, and a means of m g up
their debtors' property, even if it is not related to the claim.
This is not to say that the choice involved in whether or not
to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction involves pitting the economically advantaged against the economically deprived. In the normal quasi in rem jurisdiction case b0t.h participants have substantial resources.266The plaintiff cannot mount such a suit
unless the plaintiff has the funds t.o hire an attorney who can
find the defendant's assets and obtain an order of attachment.
Chase, supra note 13, a t 618.
This is apparently the policy choice that has been mnde by New York courts tbnt
have used the new quasi in rem jurisdiction. See notes 175-85 and accompanying text
supra. nThie this policy choice may be legitimate, i t is one for the legklnture, not the
courts, to make.
25S Chase, supra note 13, a t 634.
l M This normally occurs in commercial litigation, although omsiondly the new
quasi in rem jurisdiction has been used in tort cases. See notes 175-85and accompanying
text supra. In a tort case, the plaintiff is a creditor only when seeking to obtain o j u d p
ment against the defendant.
In Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d
432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (19%). both the p l a i n t s and the defendnnt were large mmmercid
banks. The loan that precipitated the lawsuit totalled fifteen million dollars. This a e is
typical of the kind of litigation involved in quasi in rem jurisdiction dispute. See note
201 and accompauying test supra.
lS1

2S2
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Moreover, the effort is not worth the candle unless the defendant has resources worth attaching. Furthermore, since both sides
need substantial funds, and since the claims involved are usually
commercial, either side is as capable of becoming a creditor as a
debtor. One can expect a certain amount of role-switching between plaintiffs and defendants in quasi in rern jurisdiction
cases.268Thus, "attachment jurisdiction has been essentially a
matter of intra-class, rather than inter-class,
These
policy questions are best resolved in the halls of a state legislature rather than in the courtroom. A cardinal tenet of the American political system is that political battles among equals, either
of whom have access to political power, are best resolved in the
political arena.268Unless legislation intrudes on fundamental entitlements or politically disadvantaged people, it is normally for
the Iegislatures to set the agenda, not the courts.260
Some might argue that the pre-Shaffer legislative authorization for quasi in rem. jurisdiction negates this point. However,
this argument is misplaced since those statutes were based on
the old understanding of state court jurisdiction developed when
in personam jurisdiction was severely limited by the Pennoyer
doctrine and when quasi in rern jurisdiction could be based on
the mere presence of property in the state. The legislatures that
passed these laws chose quasi in rern jurisdiction because it was
a sorely needed method of providing a forum for plaintiffs who
otherwise could not sue.260The new quasi in rern jurisdiction,
however, was created by the judiciary after all the ground rules
had changed. Thus, the argument that these statutes represent
the legislature's conscious preference for the new quasi in rern
lne "Within the commercial establishment the same people who are somotimes croditors are often debtors in other transactions and, in general, are likely to hold proporty
subject to attachment!' Chase, supra note 13, a t 620.
la' Id.
anB There is a respectable body of authority for the proposition that the judicial
power ought to be reserved for the protection of those who lack access to political power.
As one commentator pointed out: "[tlhis judicial obligation to enforce the rights of tho
politically powerless is at the heart of the American political system." Commont, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Rule for Courts in Prison Rcform, 12 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.367, 385-86 (1977). See also United States v. Carolono
AND DISTRUST
73-179 (1980);
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. ELY,DEMOCRACY
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALEL.J.
1287 (1982); Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 VAL.U.L. REV.439,443 (1082).
2n0 See note 258 and accompanying text supra.
laoSee notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
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jurisdiction over in personam jurisdiction cannot be taken
seriously.261
The New York judicial development of the new quasi in rern
jurisdiction exempaes this unjustifiable abrogation of the legislative process. The only laws on New York books authorizing
quasi in rem jurisdiction were passed h o s t fifteen years prior
to Shaffer.262After Shaffer, the Law Revision Commission, the
body charged with keeping New York statutes current, decided
that fresh authorization for quasi in rern jurisdiction was
needed.263A bill providing for this was proposed to the legislaZel A statute has been called obsolete when the legislative intent that led to its passage is no longer responsive to existing constitutional conditions. See G. CALABWI A
Coaiaio~LAWFOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982). This condition can occur when, as is the
case with old quasi in rern jurisdiction laws, the laws are "inconsistent with new cowtitutional developments." Id. a t 6.
Ch. 308, [I9621 N.Y. Laws (eff. Sept. 1,1963). This law, d i e d in CPLR 301,
provides that: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over person, property, or Status as
might have been exercised heretofore!' CPLR 301. The legislative intent for this provision was to permit state courts to exercise jurisdiction in the mnnner permitted prior to
passage of the act. At that time, of course, quasi in rern jurisdiction was utilized with the
Penmyer principles that were rejected in Shaffer. See notes 34-40,43 nnd nccompanying
text supra. It is possible to read the words "as might have been exercised heretofore" to
authorize the courts to use quasi in rern jurisdiction on a minimum contacts mther thnn
presence theory, but this was clearly not the legislature's intention becnuse:
Were this the intent, it would not have been necessary to drnft CPLR 302
. . . .The Court of Appeals has expressly rejected the suggestion thnt the cantacts theory now embodied in CPLR 302 could have been applied by the courts
even before the enactment of the CPLR; major changes in the bases of jurisdiction are, i t has declared, legislative matters.
J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN& A. MILLER,NEWYORKCIVILP R A ~ 8C301.10
E
(19WS).
In 1978, after the Shaffer decision, the New York Law Revision Commission recommended to the legislature that the CPLR be amended to permit the continued we of
quasi in rern jurisdiction in conformity with that decision. The Commission, in its report
to the legislature that year, stated that Shaffer "has deeply nffected attachment jurisdiction." Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1978 Lqislnture Relnting to Revision of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Related Provisions in Artide 3 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules, [I9781 N.Y. LAWREV. C ~ h l b l REP.
' ~ 10.
The Commission recognized that Shaffer upset "[a] cornerstone of the lnw of jurisdiction . . . that a plaintiff could obtain quasi in rern jurisdiction by attachment in an
action involving a cause of action having nothing to do with the object nttached." Id. nt
thnt attach12. The Commission stated that even before Shaffer it "was convinced
." Id. a t 13. However, the C o d i o n
ment. . . effected a denial of,due process
read Shaffer to provide some continued role for quasi in rern jurisdiction if i t were b d
on a minimum contacts analysis. T o establish this new w e of attnchment jurisdiction,
the Commission recommended that the legislature provide "guidnnce as to approprinte
criteria" for the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Id. a t 17.
The bii would have authorized quasi in rern juri~dictionin conformity with the minimum contacts analysis of Shaffer and Internotional Shoe. The b
id listed the following

. ..
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ture in 1979, but it failed to gain passage.2s4The courts fashseven factors for the court to consider in determining whether to issue a writ of projudgment attachment for this purpose:
[I.] the plaintiffs relationship to the state,
[2.] the relationship of [plaintiffs] cause of action to the state,
[3.] defendant's relationship to the state, and
[4.] any benefit accruing to [defendant] because of the relationship of his
property to the state,
[5.] the relationship of a garnishee, if any, to the state,
[6.] whether the property is tangible or intangible and if tangible, whether it is
permanently or temporarily located in this state, and
[7.] whether there is another forum in which the plaintiff could reasonably
pursue his remedy.
Id. a t 17-18. For an in-depth analysis of the bill, see Chase, supra note 13, a t 627-37. Scc
also Office of Court Administration, Legislative Memorandum S.2469, A.6836 (May 28,
1980) (reviewing the bill and expressing the opposition of the CPLR Advisory Committee on the ground that codification in the area is unwise "[ulntil the constitutional issuos
have been further clarified" by the United States Supreme Court).
The bill, Assembly No. 5836, passed the New York State Assembly on January 3,
1979, but was referred by the Senate, Senate No. 2469, to its Codes Committeo from
COMMISSION
TO THE LEGISLATUIIE
which it failed to emerge. REPORTOF THE LAWREVISION
OF THE STATEOF NEWYORK,34 (Jan. 31, 1980). The bill was reintroduced in both tho
Assembly and the Senate in the following term. See NEWYORKLEGISLATIVE
RECORD
AND
INDEX,S.154, A.355 (1980). This time it failed to pass in either house. Id. While it was
reintroduced in the Assembly the next year, it was not again considered by the Senate.
See NEWYORKLEGISLATIVE
RECORD
AND INDEX,A.8 (1981).
The rejection of this statute belies the argument that the old New York quasi in ram
jurisdiction statute provided authority for the courts to fashion a new theory for tho
doctrine after Shaffer. Although CPLR 301, which provides that New York courts "may
exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property or status as might have been exorcisod
heretofore," and CPLR 314(3) which allows service of process outside of the state when
property has been attached, remain on the books, the clear intent of tho 1963 legislature
that enacted these laws was to limit courts to using quasi in rem jurisdiction based on
Pennoyer principles. See note 262 and accompanying text supra.
The argument to the contrary is misplaced. That argument reads CPLR 301 and 314
together for the proposition that the legislature condones any use of quasi in ram jurisdiction that is constitutional. These statutes were initially passed in 1963 a t a timo when
quasi in rem jurisdiction could be obtained constitutionally whenever there was property
in the jurisdiction that was attached. See notes 27-63 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, the argument asserts that constitutional changes since that time do not
affect the meaning of the statute. All that has changed in the intervening years, tho
argument runs, is that the constitutional basis for assessing the validity of quasi in rem
jurisdiction has changed; legislative permission for its use remains.
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument it is seriously flawed. CPLR 301 wae
specifically designed to permit courts to assert jurisdiction in the ways that they had in
the past before International Shoe made possible the Gse of long arm jurisdiction. Sce
notes 40-42,44 and accompanying text supra. I t is specifically limited to that use. Undor
this arrangement the legislature used CPLR 302 to express its views about the use of tho
state's new powers to extend its judicial power to include persons who establish "minimum contacts" with the state while a t the same time codifying the older Pennoycr
"presence" basis of jurisdiction in CPLR 301. A key purpose of this limitation is to make
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ioned the new quasi in rem jurisdiction despite this legislative
rejection of a bill providing for a post-Shaffer use of the doctrine.266Thus, the effect of the New York court decisions creating the new quasi in rem jurisdiction is not only to embrace a
concept that the legislature has rejected, but to amend the
state's long arm statute. The practical consequence of these decisions is to expand the state's long arm jurisdiction to areas
that were deliberatelyoleft uncovered by the state legislat~re.2~~
This might be tolerable if the legislature had defaulted by
not making any effort to keep the long arm statute current in
light of changing technology and constitutional developments, or
if the legislature had explicitly delegated responsibility for maintaining the currency of its long arm statute to its c0urts.2~~
In
New York neither condition is true. The legislature has taken
seriously its responsibility for keeping the long arm statute current. In the quarter century since the long arm statute rras first
passed in 1963, the New York State legislature has amended it
clear that it is the legislature's province to decide how much of the new posibiiities for
extraterritorial jurisdiction it wished to take, while a t the same time preserving whnt the
judiciary done has done before.
The scheme set up in CPLR 301 and 302, therefore, foreclosed the pmibiity thnt
courts acting alone would create uses for the minimum contacts d p i s that were not
H.KORN& A. ~~ILLER, supra note 262, nt 3 301.10
covered by CPLR 302. J. WEINSTEIN,
(''Were the [contrary the] intent [of CPLR 3011, i t would not hnve been neceswy to
draft CPLR 302. . . .").Thus, the only plausible meaning of the words "as might hnve
been exercised heretofore" as applied to quasi in rern jurisdiction is that i t refers to the
old, and now discredited, pre-Shaffer method of obtaining qunsi in rern jurisdiction. The
only way to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction after Sholfer, however, is through minimum
contacts analysis. It is precisely this new way of using the state's poser thnt the legislnture reserved to itself. CPLR 301, thus, cannot be understood as giving a t e blnnche to
the judiciary to create the new quasi in rem jurisdiction. Under the scheme established
by the legislature twenty-five years ago, if New York is to have a new qunsi in rern jurisdiction it should be a legislative, not a judicial, creation.
266 See note 264 and accompanying text supra.
286 Examples include Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978);
Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and Bmco Ambrrr'a1mo E
Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1954). See
notes 134-46 and accompanying text supra.
967 The California long arm statute is a model of this type of statute. It provides for
long arm jurisdiction to the limit of the due process clause. While n statute of thnt anture h& all the difficulty described in the discussion of the unpredictability thnt results
when courts are left a t sea to adjudicate in a standardless field, see note 235 and nccompanying text supra, it a t least legitimizes judicial activity in the development of the law.
The New York legislature, however, has not opted for the Cnlifornin npprcach, See notes
134-58 and accompanying text supra.
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five times.26sEach amendment was preceded by careful study by
the New York State Judicial Conference or by the Law Revision
C o m m i s ~ i o nWhile
. ~ ~ ~ these amendments are certainly subject to
criticisrn,2?Oone cannot plausibly argue that the legislature has
defaulted in its oversight of that law. Moreover, in not one of its
amendments to the law has the legislature delegated sole responsibility to the courts to fashion the contours of the law.
The New York courts' boldness in inventing a new role for
quasi in rem jurisdiction in the face of legislative occupation of
the field is particularly perplexing when one contrasts it with the
courts' approach to in personam jurisdiction. In that area New
York courts have expressly deferred to the legislature, noting its
superior ability to fix precise jurisdictional rules. In Simonson V .
International Bank??' for example, the New York Court of Appeals, after International Shoe, refused to permit jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation under circumstances not authorized
by statute for the following reasons:

...

There can be no doubt that International Shoe Co.
opened n
broad, largely undefined area for state exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. (citing authority) The standard declared in those
cases, of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice", is
itself, at best, rather vague and nebulous. The formulation of specific
rules to implement such a standard seems more appropriately the
function of the Legislature than of the courts. There is the added consideration that legislation, as distinguished from judicial revision, is
the more suitable vehicle for fixing precise jurisdictional guidelines for
the future; only through such legislation may foreign corporations be
put on notice that they run the risk of being exposed to suit here

Ch. 590, f 1, [I9661 N.Y. Laws 1347 (adding a new provision t o C P L R 302(a) t o
cover tortious acts outside the state that cause injury within the state); Ch. 859, 1,
[I9741 N.Y. Laws 2121 (adding a new subdivision t o CPLR 302(b) t o cover matrimonial
actions); Ch. 252, 33 1, 2, [I9791 N.Y. Lavfe 482 (enlarging the transaction o f business
test o f CPLR 302(a)(l)to cover persons who contract out o f state t o provide goods or
services in the state); Ch. 281, f 22, [I9801 N.Y. Laws 444 (amending the matrimonial
provision o f CPLR 302(b) t o conform to divorce reform legislation); Ch. 505, f 1, [I9821
N.Y. Laws 1428 (amending the matrimonial section o f C P L R 302(b)).
280 See, e.g., Reese, A Study of CPLR 302 in Light of Recent Judicial Decision,
(1966); Note, supra note 45.
ELEVENTH
ANN.REP.N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE
Z70 See, e.g., Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO
L. REV.61 (1965);Note, New York's Long-Arm Jurisdiction: T h e
Case for the Agent Plaintiff, :1 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 625 (1975);Comment, T h e Long Arm
and Multiple Defendants: T h e Conspiracy Theory of i n Personam Jurisdiction, 84
COLUM.L. REV.506 (1984).
14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964).
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For over twenty-five years, New York courts have continued to
adhere to the view that the reach of that state's long arm jurisdiction is a matter for the State House, not the courthouse. Just
two years ago, for example, in Talbot u. Johnson Newspaper
C0rp.,2?~
the court rejected an attempt to assert long arm jurisdiction over a California defendant in a defamation case even
though it might have been constitutional to do so, because jurisdiction was not provided in the state's long arm
This long-standing, and quite appropriate deference to the
legislature, makes the New York courts' invention of the new
quasi in rem jurisdiction incongruous, considering that it is
based on a "gap" in the state's long arm statute. The incongruity is especially alarming since the "gap" is created by the
legislature's considered judgment to limit the reach of its jurisdiction, a judgment that the New York courts have professed to
adhere to conscientiously.

Thirteen years after Shaffer v. Heitner, a new brand of
quasi in rem jurisdiction is emerging. Invented by the New York
courts, the concept has so far attracted the approval of only a
few states. However, given the prestige and influence of the New
York Court of Appeals276and the United States Court of ApId. a t 287-88, 200 N.E.2d a t 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d a t 438 (citations omitted).
71 N.Y.2d 827, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1988).
274 Id. a t 829-30, 522 N.E.2d a t 1028-29, 527 N.Y.S.2d
a t 730-31.
Deference to the legislature has been a consistent theme in civil prmdure mnttels
in New York, except for the curious exception c m e d out for the new q u a i in rem jurisdiction. With statutes of limitations, for example, the New York Court sf Appeals has
held that the legislature is "better suited to change the rule" even though old legislation
mandated that a plaintiffs cause of action in a toxic tort case was destroyed because tho
statute applied from the date of last exposure, not the date of discovery. Fnrrell, Ciuil
Practice, 33 SYRACUSE
L. REV.31.33 (1982). In 1981, the legislature after prodding by the
court, see, e.g., Thomton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1Q02, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920 (19791, responded by amending the low. See CPLR 214-b (hlcKinney
Supp. 1981).
ns See, e.g., F. BERGAN,
THEHISTORY
OF THE NEWYORKCOURT
OF APPELUS, 18471932 248 (1985) (referring to the "prestige of the New York Court of Appeols n .a mmmon law tribunal"); R JACKSON,
THESUPREME
COURTw THE AMERICAN
SY- OF GOVERNMENT 54 (1955) (describing the New York Court of Appeals as a "great mmmon h w
court").
272
275
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peals for the Second Cir~uit,2'~
it cannot be ignored and could in
the near future win the acceptance of other states.
While a few states have explicitly rejected the concept, most
states have not. In these jurisdictions, quasi in rern jurisdiction
is not actively used, but it has not been officially buried. These
states may be influenced by the new approach. Other states have
passed legislation providing for quasi in rern jurisdiction but
have not made use of it; these states may also come into the
orbit of the new quasi in rern jurisdiction. In the aftermath of
Shaffer v. Heitner, which put the doctrine of quasi in rern jurisdiction on an equal footing with in personam jurisdiction, this
development is both surprising and troubling. After Shaffer,
there is no longer any sound reason for continuing to use quasi
in rern jurisdiction.
Quasi in rern jurisdiction is an idea whose time has gone; it
should fade from the jurisdictional landscape. The rationales offered for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction cannot withstand serious scrutiny. The new quasi in rern jurisdiction is based on the
fallacious notion that attachment jurisdiction can usefully fill
"gaps" in state long arm statutes. But any gaps that exist can
easily be plugged by the simple expedient of amending the long
arm statute itself. By doing so, rather than relying on quasi in
rern jurisdiction which requires the attachment of property prior
to any judicial determination of liability, a state can legitimately
advance the interests associated with extraterritorial jurisdiction
without intruding on the property interests of nonresident defendants. The new quasi in rern jurisdiction also unnecessarily
complicates litigation by creating a ground for pretrial motions
and hearings directed at the propriety of the attachment and by
opening up possibilites of multiple litigation of the same claim.
In addition, it adds an unneeded club for plaintiffs who might be
tempted to use attachment not to obtain jurisdiction otherwise
denied them, but to coerce settlements from nonresident defendants. Finally, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction developed by
New York courts seriously intrudes on the legitimate prerogaSee, e.g., Gould, Book Review, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 20, 1989, at 2, col. 3 (reviewing J.
MORRIS,
FEDERAL
JUSTICE
IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
(1989)) (''[Nlo one can deny that tho
quality of its judges, the richness of its contributions to American Jurisprudence, tho
historical significance of its decisions, have elevated the Second Circuit far above parochial significance into a tribunal that enjoys an awesome respect throughout that land.").
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tives of the legislature and fosters the uncertainties that often
accompany judge-made law.
While these costs might have been worth the benefits of
providing quasi in rem jurisdiction in an earlier day when there
were serious practical and doctrinal impediments to the use of in
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents, such conditions no
longer exist. The use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in our time,
whether new or old, is irrational, and very possibly unconstitutional. The overture of the New York courts to develop a new
role for quasi in rem jurisdiction should be regarded for what it
is: a siren call to return to the past.
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